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ESSAYS ON GLOBAL SOURCING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In this dissertation, we study the sourcing policies of global corporations and determine the 
key drivers of the procurement decisions under different types of uncertainties.  
The first essay explores the impact of exchange-rate and demand uncertainty on sourcing 
decisions of a multinational firm which engages in global sourcing through capacity reservation 
contracts. The focus of this essay is cost, which is known to be the main driver of global sourcing 
practices. We investigate the impact of cost uncertainty caused by exchange-rate fluctuations on 
procurement decisions, and identify the conditions that result in single and dual sourcing 
policies. Our analysis indicates that although cost is an order qualifier when exchange rate is 
considered deterministic, lower expected sourcing cost is neither necessary nor sufficient to 
source from a supplier under exchange-rate uncertainty. 
The second essay examines sourcing and pricing decisions of an agricultural processor 
encountering yield uncertainty of the agricultural input required for its offered specialty product 
and the price uncertainty of the competing commercial product. We show that uncertainty gives 
rise to a conservative sourcing policy which would never emerge in a deterministic setting. 
While both studies highlight the significant impact of uncertainty on the business decisions and 
performance, they demonstrate that the effect of uncertainty may take opposite directions 
contingent upon the business environment and the type of uncertainty. The operational 
environment studied in the first essay, provides an opportunity for the firm to benefit from 
exchange-rate fluctuations, whereas the variation in supply and the market price of the 
ii 
 
competing product are shown to diminish the firm’s expected profit in the agricultural setting 
studied in the second essay. Demonstrating the opposing behavior under different forms of 
uncertainty, this study recommends managers to think deeply about the impact of uncertainty on 
their businesses. It also provides various forms of prescriptions to mitigate risk and operate 
effectively under each uncertainty. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
In this dissertation, we study the global sourcing policies of a firm and determine the key 
drivers of the procurement decisions under different types of uncertainties.  
The first essay examines the impact of exchange-rate and demand uncertainty on sourcing 
decisions of a multinational firm which engages in global sourcing through capacity reservation 
contracts. The focus of this essay is cost, which is known to be the main driver of global sourcing 
practices. We examine the impact of cost uncertainty caused by exchange-rate fluctuations on 
procurement decisions, and identify the conditions that result in single and dual sourcing 
policies. Our analysis indicates that although cost is an order qualifier when exchange rate is 
considered deterministic, lower expected sourcing cost is neither necessary nor sufficient to 
source from a supplier under exchange-rate uncertainty. 
The second essay explores sourcing and pricing decisions of an agricultural processor 
encountering yield uncertainty of the agricultural input required for its offered specialty product 
and the price uncertainty of the competing commercial product. We show that uncertainty gives 
rise to a conservative sourcing policy which would never emerge in a deterministic setting. 
While both studies highlight the significant impact of uncertainty on the business decisions 
and performance, they demonstrate that the effect of uncertainty may take opposite directions 
contingent upon the business environment and the type of uncertainty. The operational 
environment studied in the first essay, provides an opportunity for the firm to benefit from 
exchange-rate fluctuations, whereas the variation in supply and the market price of the 
competing product are shown to diminish the firm’s expected profit in the agricultural setting 
studied in the second essay. Considering the opposing behavior under different forms of 
uncertainty, this study recommends managers to think deeply about the impact of uncertainty on 
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their businesses. It also provides various forms of prescriptions to mitigate risk and operate 
effectively under each uncertainty. 
1.1 Overview of Essay 1 
This essay of the dissertation studies a firm’s global sourcing decisions under exchange-rate 
and demand uncertainty. The firm initially reserves capacity from one domestic and one 
international supplier in the presence of exchange-rate and demand uncertainty. After observing 
exchange rates, the firm determines the amount of capacity to utilize for manufacturing under 
demand uncertainty. 
This essay makes four major contributions. First, we identify the set of optimal sourcing 
policies (one onshore, two offshore, and two dual sourcing policies), and the conditions that lead 
to each policy. Two dual sourcing policies emerge: The first one is a conservative policy where 
the firm rations limited capacity in order to minimize the negative consequences of exchange-
rate fluctuations, while the second one is an opportunistic policy and features excess capacity 
investment in order to benefit from currency fluctuations. Moreover, our analysis shows how the 
optimal sourcing policy evolves with increasing degrees of exchange-rate volatility. Second, we 
find that lower capacity and manufacturing costs are neither necessary nor sufficient to reserve 
capacity at a supplier. In other words, it may be optimal to source only from the supplier 
associated with higher (expected) sourcing cost with the proviso that it has the chance to become 
a low-cost supplier with exchange-rate fluctuations. Third, we show that risk aversion reduces 
the likelihood of single sourcing (specifically offshore sourcing) and increases the likelihood of 
dual sourcing. Fourth, our analysis demonstrates that financial hedging can eliminate the 
negative consequences of risk aversion, and make our policy findings more pronounced as they 
continue to hold under risk aversion and financial hedging. 
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1.2 Overview of Essay 2 
This essay of the dissertation studies sourcing and pricing decisions of an agricultural 
processor that sells a specialty product targeted toward the quality-sensitive segment of 
consumers while operating under two sources of uncertainty due to randomness in crop supply 
and fluctuations in market prices for a similar but inferior product. The firm (processor) initially 
leases farmland in order to obtain an agricultural input to be converted into the specialty product. 
At the end of the growing season, the firm observes the realization of both random variables, 
namely the amount of crop supply that can be converted into the specialty product, and the retail 
price of the commercial product offered by the global market. The firm then determines the 
amount of crop supply to be processed into the specialty product and the selling price of its 
specialty product. 
This essay makes three contributions. First, motivated by an emerging agribusiness practice 
in coffee industry, our study features a new agricultural supply chain framework where the 
processor engages in Direct Trade in order to be able to offer quality product. We consider the 
impact of yield uncertainty stemming from Direct Trade as well as the price uncertainty in the 
commercial market on the sourcing and pricing decisions of the firm, and identify the optimal 
sourcing and pricing decisions. Second, our analysis indicates that, under certain circumstances, 
the processor benefits from a conservative sourcing policy, which involves intentionally reducing 
the amount of leased farmland utilized for growing coffee for the specialty segment. We refer to 
this conservative behavior as the underinvestment policy. We show that higher degrees of 
uncertainty in the specialty yield or the commercial market encourage underinvestment. Third, 
we investigate the impact of correlation between the global commercial yield and the specialty 
4 
 
yield, and demonstrate that it is advantageous for the processor to invest in agricultural regions 
where the crop yield is highly positively correlated with the global yield. 
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CHAPTER 2: GLOBAL SOURCING UNDER EXCHANGE-RATE UNCERTAINTY 
2.1 Introduction 
Multinational firms have dramatically increased their sourcing from abroad in recent 
decades. Sourcing from other countries provides multinational firms with the opportunity to 
access low-cost sources, but it can also bring out additional challenges associated with currency 
fluctuations. When acquisition and operational costs are denominated in foreign currencies, 
fluctuations in exchange rates can make a source significantly less costly or more expensive. 
This essay explores the impact of exchange-rate uncertainty on the sourcing decisions of 
multinational firms. Recent literature has identified various reasons for multinational firms to 
engage in dual sourcing, including unequal and positive lead times under demand uncertainty, or 
when the delivery reliability is random. Our work adds to this list by investigating the impact of 
exchange-rate uncertainty on sourcing decisions, and in particular dual sourcing policies. Our 
study determines the key drivers behind single and dual sourcing, and shows how uncertainties 
in exchange-rate and demand influence the firm’s optimal sourcing decisions.  
Our work is motivated by global sourcing practices of a furniture company in the United 
States that specializes in school and library furniture. Selling in a domestic market, this company 
outsources most of its products from either a domestic or an international supplier. In this 
industry, the firm faces three seasons of demand (corresponding to each semester). The company 
prepares for each selling season by first reserving capacity with its suppliers well in advance. 
Depending on the product, the international supplier may be located in Europe or in Asia. After 
capacity reservation contracts are signed, the firm observes the realization of the random 
exchange rate, then determines how much to order from each supplier to prepare for the selling 
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season. Fluctuating Euro and appreciating Chinese Yuan in recent years motivated the managers 
of this firm to revisit their sourcing policies. 
Our model applies to a variety of manufacturing settings with long lead times where one firm 
outsources its production activities to contract manufacturers serving as suppliers. In addition to 
the furniture industry that motivated our problem, capacity reservation contracts are extensively 
used in other industries such as telecommunication, electronics and semi-conductor equipment 
manufacturing (Cohen et al. 2003, Erkoç and Wu 2005, Özer and Wei 2006, Peng et al. 2012). 
Long lead times and the fact that custom-designed products may not possibly be procured from a 
spot market, force the buying firms (e.g., original equipment manufacturers) to decide on 
production quantities well in advance of the selling season. Capacity reservation provides a 
guaranteed amount of capacity for the buyer and also allows the supplier to more efficiently plan 
its production and capacity expansion when necessary. Our model helps such buying firms in 
determining the most effective use of the domestic and foreign suppliers, and when to engage in 
dual sourcing. 
Our analysis considers sourcing agreements made with four types of costs. The firm initially 
pays a per-unit capacity reservation cost to the supplier in order to reserve capacity for 
production in the future. Later when the season approaches, there is another per unit operational 
cost paid to the supplier for production. The production cost at the foreign supplier incurs in the 
foreign currency. In addition to the production cost, the buying firm incurs a transportation cost 
which is considered to be inclusive of duties and other localization costs. Using the common 
theme of free-on-board shipments in global logistics, we consider the case that the buying firm 
pays for the transportation cost from the supplier, and therefore, our model features a 
transportation cost in the domestic currency of the buying firm. The fourth cost term involves 
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unused capacity; the buying firm pays penalty cost for the reserved but not utilized capacity, and 
in the case of the foreign supplier, this payment occurs in the foreign currency. Thus, the total 
landed cost is the sum of capacity reservation, production, transportation (inclusive of duties and 
localization costs), and if any, the unused capacity penalty costs. It is noteworthy that 
transportation costs made in foreign currency and/or penalty cost from unused capacity in the 
domestic currency do not alter the structural properties in our model, and thus, our results apply 
to these other cost settings.  
This essay makes four main contributions. First, we show that the set of potentially optimal 
decisions includes five distinct policies with one onshore sourcing, two offshore sourcing and 
two dual sourcing policies. The two dual sourcing policies are characteristically different. In the 
first dual sourcing policy, the firm takes a conservative action that mitigates the negative 
consequences of currency fluctuations by splitting a constant total capacity between the domestic 
and foreign suppliers. In the second dual sourcing policy, the firm reserves extra capacity in 
order to benefit from exchange-rate fluctuations. We also show how the firm switches from one 
optimal sourcing policy to another with increasing degrees of exchange-rate volatility. Second, 
our analysis shows that exchange rate uncertainty can drive a firm’s sourcing decision. In 
particular, we find that a firm may source only from the high-cost foreign supplier under 
exchange-rate uncertainty, and this can be optimal even if the expected cost of sourcing is higher 
than the selling price. This finding complements earlier literature that has characterized the role 
of cost and lead time in sourcing decisions. Third, the introduction of risk aversion makes dual 
sourcing a more desirable policy structure. It reduces the likelihood of single sourcing by 
reducing the likelihood of featuring an offshoring policy; these policies switch to dual sourcing 
when risk aversion is introduced into the model. Fourth, financial hedging helps the firm to 
8 
 
mitigate the negative consequences of risk aversion, and more importantly, it enables the firm to 
replicate the expected profit from each policy identified in the risk-neutral setting. Therefore, we 
conclude that our results are robust as the policy findings continue to hold under risk aversion 
and financial hedging.  
The remainder of this essay is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes the most related 
literature to our study. Section 2.3 presents the model, Section 2.4 analyzes it and discusses the 
results. Section 2.5 examines the impact of increasing exchange-rate uncertainty. Section 2.6 
introduces risk aversion and Section 2.7 analyzes the influence of financial hedging. Section 2.8 
presents numerical illustrations from the furniture maker that motivated our study. Section 2.9 
provides concluding remarks. All the proofs are relegated to the appendix. 
2.2 Literature Review 
This essay studies global sourcing policies in the presence of uncertain exchange rate and 
demand. There is vast literature that investigates different aspects of sourcing decisions with an 
emphasis on dual sourcing. Most recently, Jain et al. (2014) establish the potential benefit of dual 
sourcing by empirically showing that switching from single to dual sourcing policy reduces the 
inventory investment by almost 11%. One stream of research shows that the asymmetric lead 
time among suppliers is one of the drivers of dual sourcing. Fuduka (1964) is one of the earliest 
studies that shows a dual-base-stock policy is optimal when there is only one review period 
difference between the lead times of the two sources. Whittemore and Saunders (1977), 
Moinzadeh and Nahmias (1988), Moinzadeh and Schmidt (1991), Tagaras and Vlachos (2001), 
and Veeraraghavan and Scheller-Wolf (2008) extend this stream of literature by optimizing 
and/or evaluating the performance of given dual sourcing policies in more general settings with 
regard to lead time. Allon and Van Mieghem (2010) examine the cost-responsiveness trade-off 
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when splitting the supply base between a low-cost offshore and a responsive near-shore supplier. 
Wu and Zhang (2014) show that when two sources are equally costly, sourcing from the long-
lead time supplier may still be optimal under Cournot competition. However, their study does not 
allow for dual sourcing. Our work differs from this stream of literature focusing on sourcing 
policies under lead-time differences in several ways. While these studies assume deterministic 
exchange rate, our study does not feature asymmetric or stochastic lead-times. More importantly, 
our work complements this literature by showing another reason (i.e., exchange-rate uncertainty) 
for dual sourcing among optimal policies.  
Another stream of literature explores the impact of reliability on sourcing decisions. Yano 
and Lee (1995) present an extensive review of the early dual sourcing literature addressing the 
reliability aspect of sourcing in terms of both supply uncertainty and lead-time uncertainty. More 
recent studies include Tomlin and Wang (2005), Dada et al. (2007), Burke et al. (2009) and 
Kouvelis and Lee (2013). Particularly, Dada et al. (2007) investigate the cost-reliability trade-off 
in choosing the portfolio of suppliers with random capacity. Their main finding is consistent with 
Hill’s (2000) strategic note and conclude that cost is an order qualifier. Burke et al. (2009) reach 
the same conclusion in a similar setting. They point out that supplier’s cost is the key criterion 
and thus the lowest-cost supplier always receives some order quantity share. Our results 
substantially differ from theirs as we show that, in the presence of cost uncertainty, the most-
expensive source may receive even the entire order. 
Our focus of study departs from these streams of literature as we analyze the impact of cost 
uncertainty caused by exchange-rate uncertainty on sourcing policies. From this perspective, our 
work is also related to the global supply chain literature. Within this body of research, Kogut and 
Kulatilaka (1994) investigate the benefits of the flexibility to shift production between 
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geographically-dispersed facilities based on exchange-rate fluctuations. Huchzermeier and 
Cohen (1996) use a global supply chain model in order to analyze the value of operational 
hedging including holding excess capacity and production switching option. Kazaz et al. (2005) 
examine the impact of exchange-rate uncertainty in the revenues generated from sales in multiple 
markets using a single manufacturing facility. These publications also feature a recourse function 
that benefits the firm in its distribution to markets. These earlier studies do not explore the cost 
implications of various sourcing policies in depth, whereas our study focuses on sourcing 
decisions. Gurnani and Tang (1999) examine the ordering decisions of a retailer under demand 
and cost uncertainty where the retailer has two instants to order from a manufacturer prior to the 
selling season. The unit cost at the second instant is uncertain and the retailer has to evaluate the 
trade-off between a more accurate forecast and a potential higher unit cost at the second instant. 
They show that regardless of the value of information, the retailer never utilizes the cost-certain 
option (first instant) when its associated unit cost is higher than the expected unit cost of the 
cost-uncertain option (second instant) (propositions 3.1. and 3.2.). Our problem setting, however, 
features dual sourcing (sourcing from both cost-certain and cost-uncertain suppliers) even if the 
cost of sourcing from the domestic (cost-certain) supplier is higher than that of the foreign (cost-
uncertain) supplier. Chen et al. (2015) as well explore the implications of uncertainty in 
operational costs for global supply chains. While they study the optimal inventory policy in a 
periodic-review inventory system, our study examines the optimal sourcing policy in a single-
period setting.   
The major driver of global sourcing practice is well acknowledged to be seeking for cost 
reduction. As a consequence, the common assumption in this stream of literature is that the 
offshore supplier is the low-cost source. Li and Wang (2010) and Chen et al. (2014), for instance, 
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examine the trade-offs between the expensive domestic sourcing and low-cost offshore sourcing 
under exchange-rate risk. The models in these two papers feature a different setup as demand 
uncertainty is realized at the same time as exchange-rate. The firm, in our model, continues to 
make its second-stage decisions under demand uncertainty. As a consequence of the difference in 
their modeling approach, these papers do not develop dual sourcing policies with the 
characterization of rationing capacity between the two suppliers in order to mitigate exchange-
rate risk and/or investing in excess capacity in order to benefit from currency fluctuations. 
Shunko et al. (2014) study the role of transfer pricing and sourcing strategies in achieving low 
tax rates and low production costs, respectively. While they investigate how transfer pricing 
decisions impact sourcing decisions of a local manager and, thus, a multinational corporation’s 
profits, the main focus of our study is the impact of exchange-rate fluctuations on sourcing 
policies of a multinational corporation. Feng and Lu (2012) investigates strategic perils of low-
cost outsourcing and find that low-cost outsourcing may result in a win-lose outcome under 
competition. However, only single sourcing policies can be adopted in their model. Kouvelis 
(1998) justifies the use of an expensive supplier when the firm does not want to incur a switching 
cost. Our study, on the other hand, shows that the expensive foreign supplier might be the only 
source utilized in the absence of switchover costs. Fox et al. (2006) and Zhang et al. (2012) focus 
on a different aspect of global sourcing costs by distinguishing between fixed costs and variable 
costs of sourcing in an optimal inventory control study. Zhang et al. (2012) introduce an order 
size constraint which leads to dual sourcing becoming a potentially optimal policy. In the 
absence of this constraint their model does not feature dual sourcing as the optimal solution. 
Contrary to the common belief that offshore sourcing is utilized because of low sourcing costs 
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associated with foreign suppliers, we show that lower cost is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for optimality of offshore sourcing under exchange-rate uncertainty. 
Finally, our results provide insights into the ongoing debate on whether offshore sourcing is 
still economically viable (Ferreira and Prokopets, 2009; Ellram et al. 2013) even after the recent 
growing costs in emerging markets. 
2.3 Model 
The model considers a firm that sells a product in its home country at price p, and outsources 
its manufacturing to two suppliers, one in the home country (denoted H) and the other in a 
foreign country (denoted F). The random exchange rate is denoted e , its realization is denoted e 
with a probability density function (pdf) g(e), a cumulative distribution function (cdf) G(e) on a 
support [el, eh] with a mean ē. Random demand is denoted x , its realization is denoted x with a 
pdf f(x) and cdf F(x) on a support [xl, xh] where xh > xl > 0 with a mean of D.  
Figure 2.1 illustrates the setting and notation, and Figure 2.2 describes the sequence of 
decisions. In the first stage, the firm determines the amount of capacity to reserve from the two 
suppliers, denoted QH and QF, in the presence of exchange-rate and demand uncertainty. A per-
unit capacity reservation cost, denoted ki where i = H, F, is incurred in order to reserve capacity 
at each supplier in advance. 
The first-stage objective function maximizes the expected profit ( ),H FE Q QΠ    and is as 
follows:  
( ) ( ) ( )*
, 0
max , , ,
h
l
H F
H F H H F F H FQ Q
e
e
E Q Q k Q e g e dek Q Q Qπ
≥
  = −Π − + ∫   (2.1) 
where ( )* , ,H FQ eQπ  is the optimal second-stage expected profit over random demand for a 
given set of capacity reservation decisions QH and QF and realized exchange rate e.  
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Figure 2.1. Two suppliers and one market network. 
 
 
Figure 2.2. The natural sequence of events for a firm reserving production capacity from two 
suppliers. 
 
After observing the realized value of the exchange rate, correspondingly in Stage 2, the firm 
determines how much to order from each supplier in the presence of demand uncertainty, 
denoted qi, subject to the constraint of first-stage capacity reservation decisions, i.e., qi ≤ Qi 
where i = H, F. In Stage 2, the firm incurs three different kinds of costs. First, the firm pays an 
operational cost associated with production processing, denoted ci where i = H, F, denominated 
in the local currency. Thus, cF is paid in the foreign currency for each unit produced by the 
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foreign supplier, and therefore, it can be seen as a random cost as its value changes with 
exchange-rate fluctuations. Second, the firm incurs a transshipment cost that is inclusive of 
duties and localization costs in the home country currency denoted ti where i = H, F. Third, the 
firm is penalized by the supplier to pay an additional fee for unused capacity (reserved from 
Stage 1, but not utilized in Stage 2) paid in the supplier’s currency denoted ui where i = H, F. 
Like the processing cost cF, the penalty cost for unused capacity uF can also be perceived as a 
random cost as its value changes with exchange-rate fluctuations. The second-stage objective 
function maximizes the expected profit over random demand, denoted 
( )2 , | ,, ,H F H FE q q Q Qx eπ   , for a given set of first-stage capacity reservation decisions (QH, 
QF) and realized exchange rate e:  
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) { } ( )
0
*
2,
, max , | ,
=
min ,
, , ,
H F
h
l
H F H F H Fq q
H H F F H H F F
x
H H H F F F H F
x
Q Q E q q Q Q
c q c eq t q t q
u Q q u e Q q p x q q f x
e x e
dx
π π
+ +
≥
 =  
− − − −
− − − − + +∫
 (2.2) 
s.t. qi ≤ Qi for i = H, F       (2.3) 
where constraint (2.3) ensures that the production order quantities do not exceed the first-stage 
capacity reservation decisions. 
We note that the above formulation can be transformed into an equivalent formulation where 
the first-stage objective function is expressed as: 
( ) ( ) ( )*
, 0
max ,  ( ) ( ) , ,
H
h
F
l
e
e
H F H H H F F F H FQ Q
E Q Q k u Q k u e Q Q Q e g e deπ
≥
Π = −  + + − + ∫   (2.4) 
and the second-stage objective function is written as: 
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( ) ( )
( ) ( )
{ } ( )
*
2, 0
, max , | ,
( )
min ,
, , ,
H F
h
l
H F H F H Fq q
H H H H F F F F
x
H F
x
Q Q E q q Q Q
c u t q c u e t q
p x q q f x dx
e x eπ π
≥
 =  
= − + − − +
+ +∫
    (2.5) 
s.t. qi ≤ Qi for i = H, F       (2.6) 
This formulation can be interpreted as follows: The buying firm pays the penalty fee for the 
unused capacity upfront (at the same time with reserving capacity) and receives a credit for each 
unit of utilized capacity when ordering production. It is also beneficial to state that if the unit 
penalty cost from unused capacity is paid in the buying firm’s domestic currency, then uFe is 
replaced with uF in (2.5) and uFē with uF in (2.4); the change does not cause any changes in the 
structural properties of the problem. 
We introduce additional notation in order to simplify expressions: mH is the margin in the 
second stage when the product is sourced from the domestic supplier, i.e., mH = p – cH  + uH – tH, 
and Fm and mF describe the random and realized second-stage margin if the product is sourced 
from the foreign supplier, i.e., F F F Fm p c e u e t= − + −    and mF = p – cF e  + uF e – tF, respectively. 
We denote the first stage profit margins of the product sourced from the home market and 
foreign market as MH and MF, respectively, and assume that sourcing from both suppliers is 
economically viable (i.e., to avoid the trivial case of not reserving capacity):  
 (A1) MH = p – cH – tH – kH > 0, and 
( )  0F F F F FF F F Fp c e u e t k u e kE um eM E
+ +   = − =− + − − −− >     
The superscript “+” indicates the maximum of zero and the value of the term, and we use 
“increase”, “decrease”, “concave” and “convex” in their weak sense throughout this essay. 
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Note that assumption (A1) is not a restrictive assumption for the foreign supplier as its value is 
less than the expected margin (when the firm reserves and utilizes its entire capacity) MF ≥ p – cF 
ē – tF – kF. 
Our model provides the firm with the flexibility to alter its production orders based on the 
realized value of the exchange rate as long as the firm has reserved capacity. The order allocation 
flexibility enables the firm to utilize the lower cost supplier. Such variations in the optimal 
second-stage decisions influence the first-stage capacity reservation decisions. Thus, both first-
stage capacity reservation and second-stage production decisions are affected by exchange-rate 
uncertainty. 
The optimal second-stage production decisions can be classified in three regions of 
exchange-rate realizations. In the first region the realized exchange rate is so low (el ≤ e ≤ τ1 = 
(cH − uH + tH − tF)/(cF − uF)) that sourcing from the foreign supplier (i.e., offshore sourcing) is 
less costly than sourcing from the home supplier (i.e., onshore sourcing). In other words, for 
these realized values of exchange rates, offshore sourcing is more desirable than onshore 
sourcing (i.e., mF ≥ mH > 0). In the second region, the realized exchange rate is higher but not 
sufficiently high to cause offshore sourcing to be eliminated from consideration. Specifically, in 
this region we have τ1 ≤ e ≤ τ2 = (p − tF)/(cF − uF) corresponding to exchange rate realizations 
where onshore sourcing is more profitable than offshore sourcing but offshore sourcing is still 
profitable, i.e., mH > mF ≥ 0. In the third and final region, the realized value of the exchange rate 
is so high that offshore sourcing is no more a viable alternative, i.e., mF < 0. In this region, the 
firm does not order the product from the foreign supplier even if it has already reserved capacity 
in the first stage. 
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The threshold point τ1 can be lower or higher than the mean of the exchange rate ē depending 
on the relative magnitude of the cost terms. Throughout the manuscript, we do not impose any 
assumptions regarding their relative magnitudes. Figure 2.3 illustrates the three regions for an 
example where τ1 and τ2 are located within the support of e , i.e., el < (cH − uH + tH − tF)/(cF − uF) 
and eh > (p − tF)/(cF − uF). 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Exchange-rate realization in the second stage. 
 
2.4 Analysis 
2.4.1 Demand Uncertainty 
We begin our analysis by focusing on the influence of demand uncertainty. We consider the 
special case when the exchange-rate random variable is replaced by its deterministic equivalent, 
its mean ē. When uncertainty is only associated with demand, the problem becomes a single-
stage Newsvendor Problem with two suppliers. We define the total unit sourcing cost as the sum 
of unit capacity reservation, production, transportation, duties and localization costs: cHT = kH + 
cH + tH and cFT = kF + cF ē + tF. It is easy to verify that the firm would choose the supplier with 
the lowest total unit sourcing cost in this special case. Thus, the firm always chooses the single-
sourcing option. This observation is formalized in following remark that the firm would not 
engage in dual sourcing in the absence of exchange-rate uncertainty in our model.  
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Remark 2.1. Demand uncertainty by itself does not lead to dual sourcing in the operating 
environment modeled by (2.1)–(2.3). 
2.4.2 Demand and Exchange-Rate Uncertainty 
The second-stage problem conforms to the standard newsvendor structure with the first-stage 
capacity constraints. With no capacity constraints in the second stage, the optimal order 
quantities from each supplier can be determined easily by solving two independent Newsvendor 
Problems. 
2.4.2.1 Onshore Sourcing 
If the firm restricts its sourcing activities to an onshore supplier, the problem becomes a 
single-stage Newsvendor Problem and exchange-rate uncertainty becomes irrelevant. In Stage 2, 
if the firm ignores the first-stage capacity reservation contract, it would order qH0 = F–1((p – cH  + 
uH – tH)/p) units of products from the onshore source. The optimal amount of capacity reserved 
in Stage 1 is: 
 ( )( )0 1 0/H H H H HQ F p k c t p q−= − − − <  (2.7) 
In other words, when the domestic supplier is the only alternative, the firm utilizes the 
reserved capacity in its entirety in the second stage. 
2.4.2.2 Offshore Sourcing 
If the firm utilizes only the offshore source, then its second-stage production amount is 
limited by the amount of capacity reserved in stage 1 (denoted QF) as well as the amount 
established by the Newsvendor fractile (denoted qF0(e)). In the absence of a limitation caused by 
capacity reservation, the firm would prefer to produce qF0(e) = F–1((p – cFe  + uFe – tF)+/p). We 
describe the exchange rate threshold value where the firm’s first-stage production amount equals 
the desired level of second-stage production amount as τ(QF) = (p[1 – F(QF)] – tF)/(cF – uF). If 
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the realized exchange rate is less than τ(QF), the firm utilizes the entire capacity reserved from 
Stage 1 despite the preference to produce more than reserved. If the realized exchange rate is 
greater than τ(QF), however, the firm does not make use of the entire capacity reserved in Stage 
1 and produces less than QF. We describe the exchange-rate threshold that equates the second-
stage margin to zero as τ2; when the realized exchange rate is greater than τ2, the firm does not 
produce in Stage 2 because of the guaranteed loss from the negative margin. Thus, the second-
stage order quantity can be described as:  
( )
( )
( ) ( )* 0 2
2
       if 
  if 
0          if 
F l F
F F F
h
Q e e Q
q e q e Q e
e e
τ
τ τ
τ
 ≤ ≤
= < ≤
 < ≤
.      (2.8) 
The optimal capacity amount to be reserved from the offshore supplier is denoted QF0. There 
is no closed-form solution for QF0, however, it has a unique value that satisfies the following 
first-order condition (FOC): 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0( )
0( ) 0
F
l
Q
F F F F F
e
k u e c u Q e g e de
τ
τ− + + − − =∫    (2.9) 
2.4.2.3 Global Sourcing 
We next analyze the optimal capacity reservation decisions for the general problem described 
in (2.4) – (2.6). In Stage 2, if the realized exchange rate is low, below the threshold τ1 that 
equates the second-stage returns from the domestic and foreign suppliers, then the firm 
prioritizes sourcing from the foreign supplier. If the realized exchange rate is high and above the 
threshold value τ2 that equates the second-stage returns from the foreign source to zero, then the 
foreign source is not utilized at all. The following proposition provides the optimal second-stage 
production decisions at each realization of exchange rate.  
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Proposition 2.1. The optimal second-stage production decisions are: 
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In the remainder of the essay, we suppress the exchange rate parameter in the optimal second-
stage production functions unless necessary for clarity.  
We next establish that the objective function is jointly concave in its decision variables.  
Proposition 2.2. The objective function in (2.4) is jointly concave in QH and QF. 
From Proposition 2.1, it can be seen that the optimal amount of capacity reserved from the 
domestic supplier cannot exceed qH0. The optimal capacity decisions in the first stage can be 
classified into the following three sets: Region R1 = {QH, QF│QH + QF ≤ qH0}, region R2 = {QH, 
QF│QH ≤ qH0, QF ≤ qH0 and QH + QF > qH0}, and region R3 = {QH, QF│QH ≤ qH0 and QF > qH0}. 
These three regions are illustrated in Figure 2.4. 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Optimal regions for the general case of the problem. 
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We can determine the optimal capacity decisions in each of the three regions depicted in 
Figure 2.4. From Proposition 2.2, we know that the problem is jointly concave in QH and QF. 
Therefore, we can identify optimal decisions in each region through the FOC. The optimal 
capacity reservation decisions in region R1 satisfies the following system of equations:  
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Defining the values of τ(QH) and τ (QH + QF) that solve the system of equations (2.11) as τH* 
and τHF*, respectively, we can express the optimal capacity choices as follows: 
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.    (2.12) 
The optimal solution is never located in region R2; this is formalized in the following 
proposition. Considering the fact that it is never optimal to reserve more capacity than qH0 at the 
home country, this proposition guarantees that the capacity to be reserved from the foreign 
supplier is either greater than qH0, or it is sufficiently low that the total amount of capacity to be 
reserved is not more than qH0. 
Proposition 2.3. The optimal solution does not lie in region R2. 
The optimal capacity reservation decisions in region R3 satisfies the following system of 
equations:  
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Describing the values of τ(QH) and τ(QF) that solve (2.13) as τH* and τF*, respectively we can 
express the optimal capacity choices as follows: 
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2.4.3 Optimal Sourcing Policies 
We next show that there are five potentially optimal policies: one onshore sourcing, two 
offshore sourcing, and two dual sourcing policies. We describe them as follows:  
(1) Policy H: Onshore sourcing with QH* = QH0 and QF* = 0, 
(2) Policy FL: Offshore sourcing with a smaller capacity reservation QF* = QF0 ≤ qH0 and QH* 
= 0,  
(3) Policy FH: Offshore sourcing with a higher capacity reservation QF* = QF0 > qH0 and QH* 
= 0,  
(4) Policy DR: Dual sourcing featuring a rationing perspective with QH* + QF* = QF0, 
(5) Policy DE: Dual sourcing featuring excess capacity with QF* = QF0 and QH* < QH0. 
Policy H is the onshore policy where the firm reserves capacity only at the domestic supplier. 
The optimal amount of capacity to reserve is equal to QH* = QH0 where QH0 is determined 
through (2.7). The next two policies, FL and FH, are offshore policies where the optimal capacity 
reservation decisions are QF* = QF0 where QF0 is determined through (2.9). Recall that QF0 can 
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be less than or greater than qH0. We denote the offshore sourcing policy that leads to limited 
capacity investment QF* = QF0 ≤ qH0 as FL, and the offshore sourcing policy with a higher 
capacity commitment QF* = QF0 > qH0 as FH.  
The set of potentially optimal policies features two dual sourcing policies that differ 
characteristically. Policy DR is an intermediate solution in region R1 and the optimal amount of 
total capacity reserved can be obtained through the set of equations in (2.12), i.e., QH* + QF* = 
QF0. Depending on the cost parameters and the distribution of the random exchange rate, the total 
capacity is rationed between the two sources. This is a conservative and a defensive policy where 
the firm mitigates the negative consequences of currency fluctuations by distributing the total 
capacity investment between the two sources. The second dual sourcing policy is denoted DE and 
it is aggressive and opportunistic as it features excess capacity in order to enjoy the benefits of 
fluctuating exchange rates. The optimal capacity decisions are obtained through the set of 
equations in (2.14). Under DE, the firm commits to the level of capacity investment that it would 
have invested in the offshore sourcing policy FH (i.e., QF* = QF0) and it reserves an additional 
amount of capacity from the domestic source. However, this amount is strictly less than the ideal 
amount it would have reserved under the onshore sourcing policy, i.e., QH* < QH0.  Figure 2.5 
illustrates the five potentially optimal policies.  
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Figure 2.5. Set of all possible optimal solutions. 
 
The above set of potentially optimal policies can be obtained by reviewing four optimality 
conditions. These four conditions provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for each policy 
to be the optimal decision. These four optimality conditions are:  
(OC1): ( ) 0F H F FE m M k u e
++ − − − >  
 ,  
(OC2): ( ) 0F H F FE m m k u e
++ − − − >  
 , 
(OC3): ( ) 0H H H F F Fm k u E m k u e+ − − − − − >  ,  
(OC4): ( ) 0H F H HE m m k u+
+ − − − >  
 . 
Proposition 2.4 shows how the five potentially optimal policies are obtained through the 
above four optimality conditions. 
Proposition 2.4. 
(a) Policy H is optimal iff (OC1) does not hold;  
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(b) Policy FL is optimal iff (OC2) and (OC3) do not hold; 
(c) Policy FH is optimal iff (OC2) holds and (OC4) does not hold; 
(d) Policy DR is optimal iff (OC1) and (OC3) hold and (OC2) does not hold; 
(e) Policy DE is optimal iff (OC2) and (OC4) hold. 
Table 2.1 presents the necessary and sufficient conditions for each policy to be the optimal 
solution for the problem modeled in (2.4) – (2.6). Dual sourcing is the prevailing policy under 
certain conditions. The following proposition shows that a quick comparison between the 
optimal offshore capacity with the desired level of second-stage order quantity from the domestic 
source reveals which one of these two dual sourcing policies can be featured in the optimal 
solution. We also observe that QH0 establishes a minimum total capacity reservation amount for 
the global sourcing problem (see Lemma 2A.5 in the appendix). 
 
Optimal Sourcing  
Policy 
 
Optimality  
Condition 
Onshore 
Sourcing 
Offshore  
Sourcing 
Dual 
Sourcing 
H FL FH DR DE 
    (OC1) ×     
    (OC2)  ×  ×  
    (OC3)  ×    
    (OC4)   ×   
Table 2.1. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the first-stage optimal decisions. A check 
mark (“”) indicates that the corresponding inequality (i.e., optimality condition) holds when a 
particular sourcing policy is optimal, and a cross mark (“×”) indicates that the opposite 
inequality holds. 
 
Proposition 2.5. (a) If QF0 < qH0, then policy DE cannot be optimal, leaving policy DR as the 
only viable dual sourcing policy; (b) If QF0 > qH0, then policy DR cannot be optimal, leaving 
policy DE as the only viable dual sourcing policy. 
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Dual sourcing policies DR and DE exhibit completely different characteristics. We next 
provide a discussion of these two policies. 
2.4.3.1 Rationing Dual Sourcing with Policy DR 
In policy DR, the firm reserves capacity from both sources where the sum of these reserved 
capacities equals the amount of capacity it would have reserved from the offshore source, i.e., 
QH* + QF* = QF0. The firm’s allocation of capacity can be perceived as rationing capacity in 
order to mitigate cost uncertainty stemming from currency fluctuations. In this policy, the firm 
does not necessarily benefit much from currency swings. Thus, it is a defensive and a 
conservative policy that can be perceived as mitigating the negative consequences of currency 
fluctuations. Under DR, the firm always utilizes the home supplier to its maximum, i.e., qH* = 
QH* at every realization of the random exchange rate. However, it utilizes the foreign supplier up 
to its limit only when the realized exchange rate is desirable, i.e., e ≤ τ1. 
According to policy DR, the firm diversifies its supply base between a cost-uncertain and a 
cost-certain supplier in order to mitigate the negative consequences of exchange-rate uncertainty. 
However, it cannot capitalize completely in the event that exchange rate makes the foreign 
supplier an economically desirable source; this can be seen from qF* = QF0 – QH* < QF0 when el ≤ 
e ≤ τ1. 
2.4.3.2 Excess Dual Sourcing with Policy DE 
Two observations can be made regarding policy DE. First, the firm considers the foreign 
supplier as its primary source and reserves the exact amount of capacity it would have reserved 
under the offshore sourcing policies, i.e., QF* = QF0. Second, the firm reserves additional 
capacity from the domestic source. However, this amount is strictly less than what it would have 
reserved under the onshore sourcing policy, i.e., QH* < QH0. The domestic supplier appears to 
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serve as a backup source in this policy. The amount reserved at the domestic source QH* is 
utilized only when the realized exchange rate makes the foreign source an expensive supplier. 
Similarly, the foreign source is not always utilized at its maximum reserved capacity. By 
reserving a total capacity that exceeds the optimal amount that would be reserved from the 
offshore source, the firm always ends up wasting some reserved capacity, but in turn, takes 
advantage of the swings in the exchange rate. Thus, additional capacity reserved at the domestic 
source leads to an opportunistic behavior and provides the flexibility to enjoy the benefits of cost 
fluctuations. 
2.5 The Impact of Exchange-Rate Uncertainty 
In this section, we compare the optimal sourcing decisions under exchange-rate and demand 
uncertainty with those obtained under deterministic exchange rate and stochastic demand by 
replacing the random exchange rate with its deterministic equivalent. The comparison provides 
insights regarding the impact of exchange-rate uncertainty on capacity reservation decisions. It is 
shown earlier that the firm does not engage in dual sourcing under demand uncertainty in 
isolation in our model; it utilizes either the onshore source or the offshore source depending on 
the lower total cost of sourcing. We examine the capacity choices under the cases with one 
source featuring the lower total sourcing cost. 
Case 1: Lower expected cost at the foreign supplier: kF + cFē + tF < kH + cH + tH. When the 
foreign supplier has the lower expected total sourcing cost, the firm always chooses offshore 
sourcing under deterministic exchange rate. However, this is not necessarily the case if the 
exchange rate is uncertain.  
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Proposition 2.6. When the foreign supplier has the lower expected total unit sourcing cost, the 
firm utilizes either an offshore sourcing policy (FL or FH) or the dual sourcing policy DE under 
exchange-rate and demand uncertainty. 
The above proposition implies that lower expected cost of sourcing is not a sufficient 
condition for offshore sourcing. More specifically, when the exchange-rate uncertainty is taken 
into account, it may be optimal for the firm to utilize dual sourcing, rather than offshore 
sourcing, under specific conditions even if the expected total unit sourcing cost is lower for the 
foreign supplier.  
Case 2: Lower cost at the domestic supplier: kF + cFē + tF ≥ kH + cH + tH. When sourcing from 
the domestic supplier is less costly, the firm always chooses onshore sourcing under 
deterministic exchange rate. The next proposition indicates that the offshore sourcing policy can 
be optimal despite featuring a more expensive foreign supplier. 
Proposition 2.7. When the domestic supplier has the lower total unit sourcing cost, offshore 
sourcing policies (FL or FH) can be optimal under exchange-rate and demand uncertainty. 
Proposition 2.7 shows that it is not necessary to have the lowest total sourcing cost in order to 
reserve capacity at a single source. It shows that lower sourcing cost from the domestic supplier 
does not eliminate the possibility of offshore sourcing. Alternatively said, offshore sourcing does 
not need to feature the lower expected sourcing cost to be the optimal policy. This result 
contrasts the common rationale behind offshore sourcing practices that often justify working 
with foreign sources because of the lower cost feature. In our finding, however, foreign source is 
utilized only when the exchange rate is lower, and thus, the effective cost of utilizing the foreign 
source is lower than its expected sourcing cost. 
29 
 
Table 2.2 illustrates how introducing exchange-rate uncertainty can significantly influence 
the optimal sourcing policy when compared to the case where uncertainty is associated only with 
demand. In other words, ignoring the exchange-rate uncertainty may result in decisions that are 
far from optimal. 
Through propositions 2.6 and 2.7, we conclude that lower unit costs are neither necessary nor 
sufficient to reserve capacity at a supplier. We next show that exchange-rate uncertainty can be 
influential in offshore sourcing even if the foreign source has a negative expected profit margin 
in the second stage. 
 
Cost Structure Demand Uncertainty 
Optimality 
Conditions 
Exchange-Rate and  
Demand Uncertainty 
Case 1 
 kF + cF ē + tF <  
kH + cH + tH 
Offshore 
Sourcing 
OC2  
OC4  Excess Dual Sourcing (DE) 
OC4  Offshore Sourcing (FH) 
OC2  Offshore Sourcing (FL) 
Case 2 
 kF + cF ē + tF ≥  
kH + cH + tH 
Onshore 
Sourcing 
OC2  
OC4  Excess Dual Sourcing (DE) 
OC4  Offshore Sourcing (FH) 
OC2  
OC1  
OC3  Rationing Dual Sourcing (DR) 
OC3  Offshore Sourcing (FL) 
OC1 Onshore Sourcing (H) 
Table 2.2. The impact of exchange-rate uncertainty on sourcing decisions. An overscore implies 
the reversed condition. 
 
Proposition 2.8. The optimal sourcing policy may be dual sourcing (DR or DE) or offshore 
sourcing (FL or FH) when p – (cF – uF)ē – tF < 0.  
The consequence of the above proposition is that the firm can choose offshore sourcing even 
if it is expected to lose money in the second stage with p – (cF – uF)ē – tF < 0. Note that this is a 
stronger condition than negative expected margin in the first stage with p – cFē – tF – kF < 0. 
Under deterministic exchange rate, the firm may not even consider the foreign supplier when the 
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second-stage return is negative. Thus, exchange-rate uncertainty creates the opportunity for the 
firm to reserve capacity at a supplier even with negative expected margin in the second-stage. 
Proposition 2.8 implies that the firm may benefit from giving up a deterministic positive profit 
margin from sourcing through the domestic supplier, and instead engage with a single foreign 
source even if the expected unit cost from the offshore source (in stage 2) is higher than the unit 
price. In this case, postponing the sourcing decision until the revelation of the exchange rate 
provides the benefit of potentially high profit margin caused by low exchange-rate realizations. It 
also comes at the expense of incurring a potential loss (the sum of capacity reservation cost and 
penalty cost of unused capacity) at high realizations of exchange rate. This flexibility can 
increase the desirability of the foreign supplier so much that the firm prefers to utilize offshore 
sourcing without a domestic supplier even if the foreign supplier has an expected unit cost in 
Stage 2 higher than the market price.  
We next investigate the impact of exchange-rate volatility on the optimal sourcing policy, 
and the expected profit. 
Proposition 2.9. (a) The optimal foreign capacity QF* always increases in exchange-rate 
volatility. But the optimal domestic capacity QH* may increase or decrease. (b) The expected 
profit increases in exchange-rate volatility. 
This proposition formally establishes the opportunity that exchange-rate fluctuations along 
with the flexibility to postpone the production decisions until realization of the exchange rate can 
provide for a firm to improve its expected profit. It is worth noting the asymmetry between the 
downside consequences and the upside potential of exchange uncertainty in this business 
environment. While lower realizations of the exchange rate lead to higher profits, the amount of 
loss due to high realizations is restricted to the total amount of capacity reservation and penalty 
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costs corresponding to the case where the firm does not order production to the foreign supplier. 
This asymmetry is key to creating the opportunity to benefit from the higher exchange-rate 
volatility. 
As for the sourcing decisions, one would intuit that higher degrees of exchange-rate volatility 
create the incentive to invest in additional flexibility through domestic capacity. However, 
Proposition 2.9 indicates that the optimal domestic capacity does not behave monotonically in 
exchange-rate volatility as it may exhibit a decreasing behavior as well. The next proposition 
establishes the condition under which the firm indeed reduces its domestic capacity investment 
under a uniform exchange-rate distribution.  
Proposition 2.10. When the exchange rate is uniformly distributed, under policy DE, the optimal 
domestic capacity QH* decreases in exchange-rate volatility iff kH + cH  + tH < (cF – uF)ē + tF. 
The condition in Proposition 2.10 seems counter-intuitive at first sight as it suggests that 
when total unit cost of sourcing from the domestic source is lower than the expected cost of 
sourcing from the foreign source, the domestic capacity decreases in exchange-rate uncertainty. 
We note that this proposition does not imply that reducing the cost of onshore sourcing leads to 
lower optimal capacity at the domestic source. In fact, when kH + cH  + tH < (cF – uF)ē + tF, the 
firm reserves higher levels of domestic capacity at any degree of exchange-rate volatility 
compared to the opposite case (i.e., kH + cH  + tH > (cF – uF)ē + tF). The condition in Proposition 
2.10 requires that the cost of sourcing from the domestic source is low, and thus, the firm has 
already reserved a sufficiently high level of domestic capacity under policy DE. Consequently, 
the domestic capacity becomes a substitute for the foreign capacity which increases in exchange-
rate volatility (according to Proposition 2.9). As a result, the firm reduces its high capacity 
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commitment to the domestic source in order to capitalize more on the prospects of sourcing from 
the foreign supplier. 
The following proposition sheds light on how the optimal sourcing policy evolves with 
exchange-rate volatility. 
Proposition 2.11. As the exchange-rate volatility increases:  
(a) if kF + cFē + tF < kH + cH + tH, then the optimal sourcing policy changes according to the 
following path (or a continuous portion thereof): FLFHDE; 
(b) if kF + cFē + tF ≥ kH + cH + tH, then the optimal sourcing policy changes according to the 
following paths (or a continuous portion thereof): HDR FLFHDE, or HDRDE. 
Proposition 2.11 establishes the optimal policy paths that the firm follows as exchange-rate 
volatility increases. Specifically, when the foreign supplier is associated with lower expected unit 
sourcing cost, the firm either keeps offshore sourcing or switches to policy DE utilizing excess 
capacity. On the other hand, when the unit cost of sourcing from the domestic supplier is lower, 
the firm switches from onshore sourcing to the dual sourcing policy exhibiting rationing 
behavior (DR). With increasing exchange-rate volatility the firm either directly switches to the 
excess dual sourcing policy (DE) or first adopts offshore sourcing policies before implementing 
the excess dual sourcing policy. We observe that as the degree of exchange-rate variation 
increases, the foreign supplier becomes a more desirable supplier. As mentioned before, this is 
because there are higher chances of a large savings due to low realization of the exchange rate 
while the possible loss due to the appreciation of the exchange rate—which is as much as the 
capacity reservation cost plus the penalty cost of unused capacity—remains unchanged. 
Consequently, high volatility of exchange rate results in choosing the foreign supplier as the 
primary source (corresponding to policies FL, FH, and DE). 
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2.6 Risk Aversion 
This section presents the influence of risk aversion on the part of the buying firm. We utilize 
the value-at-risk (VaR) measure to limit the risk associated with the realized profits in the global 
sourcing problem under exchange-rate and demand uncertainty. VaR is the most widely 
employed risk measure in practice and is the prevailing risk approach in the Basel II and III 
Accords specifying the banking laws and regulations issued by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (2013). There are two parameters that describe the firm’s risk preferences in VaR: β  
≥ 0 represents the loss (value at risk) that the firm is willing to tolerate at probability α, where 0 
≤ α ≤ 1. For a given α, if VaR is more than the tolerable loss β, then first-stage decisions (QH, 
QF) correspond to an infeasible solution. We incorporate the firm’s VaR concern into the model 
in (2.1) – (2.3) by supplementing the first-stage problem with the following probability 
constraint:  
( ) ( ), ,H Fe x Q QP β α < − ≤Π               (2.15) 
where  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ){ }
* *
* * * *                     min ,
,H F H H F F H H H F F F
H H H F F F H F
Q Q k Q k Q c t q e c e t q e
u Q q e u e Q q e p x q e q e
+ +
Π = − − − + − +
− − − − + +
  
     
   
is the random profit from the optimal second-stage decisions and first-stage capacity reservation 
decisions (QH, QF) and ( ) [ ],e xP ⋅   represents the probability over the exchange-rate and demand 
random variables. Constraint (2.15) states that the probability that the realized loss exceeds β 
should be less than or equal to the firm’s tolerable loss probability α.  
Before proceeding with the analysis of risk aversion, it is important to make several 
observations. In the absence of exchange-rate uncertainty, the introduction of risk aversion 
through a VaR constraint as in (2.15) does not lead to dual sourcing. It is already pointed out 
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earlier that when random exchange rate is replaced with its certainty equivalent ē in the risk-
neutral setting, the firm works with only one supplier and reserves capacity at the lower cost 
source. Moreover, the second-stage production amount is always equal to the amount reserved 
from Stage 1 as long as the firm operates with positive margins. When the optimal capacity 
reserved at the low-cost source (let us denote it with QN) violates the VaR constraint due to the 
stochastic demand, then the firm would reduce its initial capacity reservation to satisfy the 
constraint at the tolerated loss. Specifically, let xα denote the value of the demand random 
variable that corresponds to α probability in its cdf. It is sufficient to check the value of the 
realized profit at xα from reserving QN units of capacity at the low cost supplier j: If p xα – (kj + cj 
+ tj)QN  < – β, then the firm reduces its initial capacity investment from QN to QA = (p xα – β)/(kj 
+ cj + tj) where QA describes the amount of capacity reserved in Stage 1 due to risk aversion. 
Thus, in the absence of exchange-rate uncertainty, the firm reduces its initial capacity reservation 
commitment as a result of risk aversion but does not switch to dual sourcing.  
We next examine the impact of risk aversion in the presence of exchange-rate uncertainty. 
Let eα denote the exchange rate realization at fractile 1 – α (i.e., [1 – G(eα)] = α). Because 
demand uncertainty in isolation does not lead to any policy change in our model, but rather a 
reduction in reserved capacity, we focus on problem settings where exchange-rate is a source of 
uncertainty in violating the VaR requirement with eα > τ2. Exchange-rate realizations greater than 
τ2 are most detrimental to the firm because it would waste the entire capacity reserved at the 
foreign source due to the fact that qF*(e) = 0 for e ≥ τ2. 
In the presence of exchange-rate uncertainty, incorporating risk aversion encourages the firm 
to engage in dual sourcing. This can be seen when the optimal policy in the risk-neutral setting is 
an offshore sourcing policy as in the case of policies FH and FL. When risk aversion is included 
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and the VaR constraint is violated, the firm can decrease the level of capacity investment in the 
foreign source in order to comply with the VaR constraint in (2.15). Let us define QFA as the 
level of capacity reserved at the foreign source that yields realized profit equal to –β at 
exchange-rate realization eα, i.e.,   
( )AF F FQ k u eαβ= + .         (2.16)  
We use the following two conditions in Proposition 2.12, which characterizes when the firm 
switches from single sourcing at the foreign source (i.e., offshore sourcing policies FH and FL) to 
dual sourcing:  
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Proposition 2.12. Suppose the risk-neutral optimal solution violates the VaR constraint, and eα 
≥ τ2, uF > 0. 
(a) When the optimal sourcing policy in the risk-neutral setting is FH and AFQ > qH0, the firm 
switches to dual sourcing under risk aversion if RA1 holds;  
(b) When the optimal sourcing policy in the risk-neutral setting is either FL or FH with AFQ  ≤ qH0, 
the firm switches to dual sourcing under risk aversion if RA2 holds.  
From Proposition 2.12, we see conditions that cause the firm to switch from offshore 
sourcing policies that are optimal in a risk-neutral setting to dual sourcing. Condition RA1 is a 
stronger condition because the right hand side (RHS) of RA1 is greater than that of RA2 when 
A
FQ > qH0. In this case, when RA1 holds, condition RA2 also holds. Thus, RA1 can be perceived 
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as a sufficient condition that, when an offshore sourcing policy is optimal in the risk-neutral 
setting, then the firm switches to dual sourcing as a consequence of risk aversion. It can also be 
shown that when dual sourcing policies are optimal in the risk-neutral setting, they continue to be 
optimal under risk aversion in our model. In conclusion, our analysis shows that the introduction 
of risk aversion through a VaR constraint leads to a higher likelihood of dual sourcing. 
2.7 Financial Hedging 
We next examine the impact of introducing the flexibility to purchase financial hedging 
instruments on the firm’s risk concern and expected profit. We consider the case when the firm 
obtains a certain number of currency futures contracts, denoted H, in stage 1 along with its 
capacity reservation decisions (QH, QF). Each unit of financial hedging contract has a unit cost of 
h(es) (also referred to as the premium) and a strike (or, exercise) price of es. We assume that the 
financial institution sells the hedging instrument at cost, i.e.,  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
h s
s l
e e
s s s
e e
h e e e g e de e e g e de= − − −∫ ∫ .       (2.17) 
In Stage 1, the firm now determines the optimal values of (QH, QF, H) in order to maximize 
the expected profit subject to the same VaR requirement:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )*
, , 0
, ,max ,,  ,
H
l
F
h
H F H H F F H FQ Q
e
H
e
sH h e H H e g e dE Q Q k Q k Q Q Q eπ≥   − +Π = − −  ∫ .  (2.18) 
In Stage 2, all financial hedging contracts purchased in Stage 1 are exercised. Subject to the 
same capacity reservation constraint in (2.3), the second-stage objective function in (2.2) is then 
revised as follows:  
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The objective function in (2.19) adds the term (e – es)H into (2.2). The advantage of 
employing financial hedging in Stage 1 enables the firm to eliminate the negative consequences 
of the VaR constraint in (2.15), which can now be expressed as follows:  
( )
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The firm’s tolerated loss probability α is not exceeded when the firm is ensured to have 
realized profits greater than or equal to –β when the exchange-rate random variable takes values 
in the range el ≤ e ≤ eα. For any given (QH, QF), if the VaR constraint in (2.15) is violated, then 
the firm determines the number of hedging contracts that would satisfy the same risk concern 
expressed in (2.20) even at the lowest second-stage revenues occurring at x = xl. This is 
formalized in the next proposition. 
Proposition 2.13. If the first-stage decisions (QH, QF) does not satisfy the VaR constraint in 
(2.15) then  
(a) the firm can purchase the following number of financial hedging contracts with a strike price 
es ≤ eα and premium h(es) as defined in (2.17) 
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 (2.21) 
and satisfy (2.20); and  
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(b) the expected profit E[Π(QH, QF, H*(es))] under risk aversion and financial hedging is 
equivalent to E[Π(QH, QF, 0)] of the risk-neutral setting in the absence of the VaR constraint 
(2.15). 
Proposition 2.13(a) shows that financial hedging enables the firm to satisfy the VaR 
constraint. The number of hedging contracts specified in (2.21) accounts for the losses that can 
incur at all of the undesirable exchange-rate realizations in the range of eα ≤ e ≤ eh corresponding 
to α percent in the cdf. Thus, the number of financial hedging contracts in (2.21) guarantees that 
the firm’s losses exceeding β is less than or equal to the firm’s tolerated loss probability α.   
Proposition 2.13(b) shows that financial hedging is also beneficial in terms of protecting the 
expected profit. For any capacity reservation decisions (QH, QF) in stage 1, financial hedging 
enables the firm to obtain the same expected profit it earned in the risk-neutral setting without 
having to sacrifice initial capacity reservation in order to satisfy the VaR constraint.  
The consequence of Proposition 2.13(b) is that the firm’s set of potential optimal policies under 
risk aversion and financial hedging is identical to the set of policies developed in Section 2.4 for 
the risk-neutral setting. Thus, we conclude that financial hedging not only eliminates the 
negative consequences of risk aversion, but also makes our five potentially optimal policies to 
hold under more general settings.  
In sum, we find that our insights into the role of exchange rate uncertainty on optimal 
sourcing decisions are robust; we find that the introduction of risk aversion via a VaR constraint 
can make dual sourcing more likely and that our conclusions are unaffected by the use of 
financial hedging to mitigate risk. 
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2.8 Numerical Illustration 
In this section, we provide numerical illustrations from the operating environment of the 
furniture manufacturer that motivated our study. For this furniture company specializing in 
school and library furniture, there are three selling season, each representing a four-month time 
window (following the traditional school semesters). The furniture maker develops a forecast for 
its products for each selling season (for four months). The firm makes capacity reservation 
decisions one selling season in advance. Book carts, one of the firm’s best known products, are 
sourced from small suppliers that charge a unit capacity reservation cost ranging from 1% to 5% 
of the selling price. The firm has other products where the unit capacity reservation cost is 
between 5% and 10% of the selling price (e.g., office desks and chairs). We present the results 
associated with surprising insights, and ignore the expected results associated with product with 
higher unit capacity reservation costs.  
The capacity reservation payment is made at the spot exchange rate one season before the 
selling season approaches (equivalent to four months). Thus, it can be converted to domestic 
currency using the spot exchange rate at the time of the initial payment. Four months later, 
corresponding to the beginning of the selling season, the furniture maker specifies the exact 
amount of products to be manufactured at each supplier. It is important to note that the firm 
continues to operate under demand uncertainty during the selling season; schools and libraries 
continue to place orders during the selling season.  
We next describe the data used to represent exchange-rate fluctuations. Our analysis uses 
data on the daily Euro-Dollar exchange rate from the beginning of 2010 through the end of 2012 
(3-year period), corresponding to the planning period for the furniture maker that motivated our 
problem. We first analyze the rate of change in the exchange rate in four months. We accomplish 
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this goal by examining each daily exchange rate (or, spot rate), denoted st, and comparing it with 
the daily exchange rate of four months later, denoted st+120, within our three-year data set. 
Specifically, for each day over the 3-year period, we calculate the proportion of the exchange-
rate four months into the future relative to the current exchange rate, i.e., et = st+120/st. The 
comparison of the daily exchange rate with its counterpart in four months results in an empirical 
distribution which we use in our analysis. Figure 2.6(a) provides the histogram of the empirical 
distribution representing the fluctuations in the Euro-Dollar exchange rate used in our numerical 
illustrations. Figure 2.6(b) shows the frequency distribution of the change in the value of the 
exchange rate in four months. As can be seen from Figure 2.6(b), there would not be a well-
fitting statistical distribution to represent the change in exchange rates in four months. Therefore, 
we use the entire data set of the changes during the period of 2010 – 2012 as our distribution in 
the analysis.  
In order to provide a meaningful and comparative analysis without revealing costs and prices, 
we normalize the selling price to $100, and scale the capacity reservation and transportation 
costs accordingly. Figure 2.7 demonstrates the optimal decisions with changing values of the 
second-stage operational costs, cH and cF, as described in horizontal and vertical axes, 
respectively. The unit capacity reservation costs, kH and kF, are smallest in Figure 2.7(a), at 1% 
of the selling price, and their values increase in figures 2.7(b) and 2.7(c) up to 5% of the selling 
price. The same policy indicators, {H, FL, FH, DR, DE}, are used to designate the five potentially 
optimal policies identified in Section 2.4.  
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Figure 2.6. The Euro-Dollar exchange rate between 2010 – 2012. (a) Histogram of the actual 
values representing the variation in the Euro-Dollar exchange rate. (b) Frequency distribution of 
the proportions representing the change in the value of the exchange rate in four months. 
   
 
(a) kH = $1, kF = $1 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1.
2
1.
23
1.
26
1.
29
1.
32
1.
35
1.
38
1.
41
1.
44
1.
47 1.
5
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Euro-Dollar exchange rates
mean = 1.335, standard deviation = 0.065
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
0.
85
0.
88
0.
91
0.
94
0.
97 1
1.
03
1.
06
1.
09
1.
12
1.
15
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Proportions (St+120 / St )
mean = 0.995, standard deviation = 0.060
0.0 60.0 60.5 61.0 61.5 62.0 62.5 63.0 63.5 64.0 64.5 65.0 65.5 66.0 66.5 67.0 67.5 68.0 68.5 69.0 69.5 70.0 70.5 71.0 71.5 72.0 72.5 73.0 73.5 74.0 74.5 75.0 75.5 76.0 76.5 77.0 77.5 78.0 78.5 79.0 79.5 80.0 80.5 81.0 81.5 82.0 82.5 83.0 83.5 84.0 84.5 85.0 85.5 86.0 86.5 87.0 87.5 88.0 88.5 89.0 89.5 90.0
60.0 DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
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61.0 DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
61.5 DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
62.0 DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
62.5 DR DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
63.0 DR DR DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
63.5 H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
64.0 H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
64.5 H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
65.0 H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
65.5 H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
66.0 H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
66.5 H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
67.0 H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
67.5 H H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
68.0 H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
68.5 H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
69.0 H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
69.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
70.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
70.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
71.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
71.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
72.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
72.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
73.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
73.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
74.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
74.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
75.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
75.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
76.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
76.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
77.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
77.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
78.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
78.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
79.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
79.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
80.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
80.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
81.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
81.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
82.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
82.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
83.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
83.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
84.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
84.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
85.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
85.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
86.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
86.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
87.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH FH
87.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH FH
88.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH
88.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH FH
89.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH FH
89.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH
90.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DE DE DE DE DE DE FH FH
CH
CF
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(b) kH = $2, kF = $2 
 
 
(c) kH = $5, kF = $5 
Figure 2.7. Optimal sourcing policies with changing second-stage operational costs (cH, cF) 
between $60 and $90, with varying unit capacity reservation costs (kH, kF), with unit 
transportation costs tH = $2, tF = $4, and zero penalty cost of unused capacity (uH = uF = 0). The 
“---“ sign means the cost terms do not satisfy assumption A1. The values of kF and cF are 
equivalent to their corresponding dollar values at time 0. 
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60.0 FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
60.5 FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
61.0 DR FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
61.5 DR DR FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
62.0 DR DR DR FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
62.5 H DR DR DR FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
63.0 H H DR DR DR FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
63.5 H H H DR DR DR FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
64.0 H H H H DR DR DR FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
64.5 H H H H H DR DR DR FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
65.0 H H H H H H DR DR DR FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
65.5 H H H H H H H DR DR DR FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
66.0 H H H H H H H H DR DR DR FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
66.5 H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
67.0 H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
67.5 H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
68.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
68.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
69.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
69.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR DR FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
70.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR DR FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
70.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR DR FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
71.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR DR FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
71.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR DR FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
72.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR DR FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
72.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR DR FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
73.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR DR FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
73.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR DR FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
74.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR DR FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
74.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR DR FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
75.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR DR FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
75.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR DR FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
76.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR DR FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
76.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR DR FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
77.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR DR FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
77.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR DR FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
78.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR DR FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
78.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR DR FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
79.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR DR FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
79.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR DR FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
80.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR DR FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
80.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR DR DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
81.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR DR DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
81.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR DR DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
82.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR DR DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
82.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR DR DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
83.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR DR DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
83.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR DR DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
84.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR DR DE FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
84.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR DR FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
85.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR DR FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
85.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR DR FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
86.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR DR FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
86.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR DR FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
87.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR DR FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
87.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR DR FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
88.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR DR FH FH FH FH FH FH FH
88.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR DR FH FH FH FH FH FH
89.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR DR FH FH FH FH FH
89.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR DR FH FH FH FH
90.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR DR DR FH FH FH
CH
CF
0.0 60.0 60.5 61.0 61.5 62.0 62.5 63.0 63.5 64.0 64.5 65.0 65.5 66.0 66.5 67.0 67.5 68.0 68.5 69.0 69.5 70.0 70.5 71.0 71.5 72.0 72.5 73.0 73.5 74.0 74.5 75.0 75.5 76.0 76.5 77.0 77.5 78.0 78.5 79.0 79.5 80.0 80.5 81.0 81.5 82.0 82.5 83.0 83.5 84.0 84.5 85.0 85.5 86.0 86.5 87.0 87.5 88.0 88.5 89.0 89.5 90.0
60.0 FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
60.5 FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
61.0 DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
61.5 H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
62.0 H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
62.5 H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
63.0 H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
63.5 H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
64.0 H H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
64.5 H H H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
65.0 H H H H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
65.5 H H H H H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
66.0 H H H H H H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
66.5 H H H H H H H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
67.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
67.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
68.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
68.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
69.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
69.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
70.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
70.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
71.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
71.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
72.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
72.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
73.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
73.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
74.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
74.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
75.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
75.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
76.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
76.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
77.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
77.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
78.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
78.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
79.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
79.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
80.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
80.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
81.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
81.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
82.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
82.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
83.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
83.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH FH ---
84.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH FH ---
84.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH FH ---
85.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH FH ---
85.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH FH ---
86.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FH ---
86.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL ---
87.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL FL ---
87.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL FL ---
88.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL FL ---
88.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL FL ---
89.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR FL FL FL FL ---
89.5 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR FL FL FL ---
90.0 H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H DR FL FL ---
CH
CF
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Several observations can be made from the comparison of figures 2.7(a) – (c). First, it is easy 
to see that when the operational cost of the home (foreign) source is significantly less expensive 
than that of the foreign (domestic) source, then the optimal policy is a single source policy H (F).  
Second, dual sourcing policies are optimal in a region where the second-stage operational 
costs are relatively similar. This region of dual sourcing (see the diagonal axis) is larger when the 
unit reservation costs, kH and kF, are relatively small. The region of dual sourcing shrinks with 
increasing values of kH and kF (as can be seen from the comparison of figures 2.7(a) – (c)). This 
result indicates that when the unit capacity reservation costs are small in comparison to selling 
prices, the firm can enjoy the benefits from the fluctuations in exchange rates by adjusting the 
production levels in Stage 2. Thus, dual sourcing policies DR and DE are more desirable. On the 
other hand, if the unit capacity reservation costs are higher in value relative to the selling price, 
then the firm is less likely to commit to two suppliers upfront. Thus, single source policies H, FL 
and FH are more desirable. In terms of the products offered by the furniture company that 
motivated our study, dual sourcing is more desirable for products such as book carts (with lower 
capacity reservation costs relative to the selling price), and single sourcing is the preferred 
sourcing policy for office furniture (with relatively higher unit capacity reservation costs).  
Third, the region for dual sourcing shows an increasing and a decreasing behavior with 
increasing values of the second-stage production costs (cH and cF). There are two opposing 
drivers for this phenomenon. First, higher operational costs in Stage 2 diminish the relative 
magnitude of the unit capacity reservation costs of Stage 1. Therefore, the firm perceives 
reserving capacity to be less expensive in sourcing decisions; this leads to a wider range of 
second stage operational costs that feature dual sourcing policies as the optimal choice. On the 
other hand, higher operational costs reduce the value that can be gained from dual sourcing 
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policies. Specifically, as the operational costs increase, sourcing from both suppliers become less 
profitable, and thus the potential gain from dual sourcing policies declines with higher second-
stage operational costs. As a consequence, the region of dual sourcing shrinks as the operational 
costs continue to increase in relative to the selling price.  
Fourth, policy DR is more desirable than policy DE at higher values of kH and kF as in Figure 
2.7(c). This is because there is not a sufficient degree of exchange-rate volatility to benefit from 
having excess capacity in place. Similarly, policy DE is more often the desired dual sourcing 
policy (over policy DR) in the bandwidth representing dual sourcing preferences at lower values 
of kH and kF as in Figure 2.7(a). With lower capacity reservation costs (relative to the selling 
price), the firm has a higher degree of benefit from exchange rate fluctuations under policy DE in 
Stage 2, without having to make a significant payout in Stage 1. While not presented in these 
numerical illustrations, the range of dual sourcing increases with a higher degree of variation in 
exchange rates. The Euro-Dollar exchange rate is perceived to be the most stable exchange rate 
by industry professionals, and our data represents a conservative impact of exchange rate 
variations in capacity reservation decisions. Higher variation in exchange rates would be 
observed in other currency conversions. A higher degree of variation in the exchange rate 
increases the benefits from recourse, and specifically increases the value gained from adjusting 
production levels based on the realized values of exchange rates. Thus, a higher degree of 
exchange-rate variability makes dual sourcing a more desirable alternative over single sourcing 
policies. 
2.9 Conclusions and Managerial Insights 
This essay examines the impact of exchange-rate uncertainty on capacity reservation 
decisions for a global firm. We develop an analytical model for a firm that sources from two 
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suppliers, one domestic and one foreign, and sells in a single market. While demand uncertainty 
in isolation (i.e., ignoring the impact of exchange-rate uncertainty) does not lead to dual sourcing 
in our model, exchange-rate uncertainty creates the incentive for the firm to engage in dual 
sourcing. 
This study makes four contributions. First, we identify the set of potentially optimal policies 
and the conditions that lead to these policies. Five potentially optimal sourcing policies emerge: 
One onshore sourcing, two kinds of offshore souring policies, and two characteristically different 
dual sourcing policies. One dual sourcing policy commits to a total capacity amount that would 
equal the amount it would have reserved under the offshore sourcing policy, but it rations this 
total capacity investment between the domestic and foreign suppliers according to the exchange-
rate uncertainty. This dual-sourcing policy can be perceived as a defensive and a conservative 
approach as it is motivated to negate the detrimental consequences of an appreciating exchange 
rate making the foreign supplier an expensive source. The same policy foregoes the benefits of a 
lower cost foreign supplier under realizations of exchange-rate devaluation. The second dual 
sourcing policy features excess capacity. The same amount of capacity is reserved at the foreign 
supplier as with the offshore sourcing policy, and there is additional capacity reserved at the 
domestic supplier. However, the amount of capacity reserved at the domestic supplier is less than 
the amount that would have been reserved under the onshore sourcing policy. Thus, the domestic 
supplier capacity is perceived as a backup capacity, and is intended to be utilized in order to 
benefit from exchange-rate fluctuations. We show that these five policies can be located by 
checking four optimality conditions. The conditions clarify how the firm switches its optimal 
policy choice from one sourcing policy to another with increasing degrees of exchange-rate 
volatility.  
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Second, our analysis shows that a lower sourcing cost is neither a necessity nor a sufficient 
condition to reserve capacity at a supplier. Under exchange-rate uncertainty, lower unit sourcing 
cost does not necessarily qualify a supplier as a potential source. It can be optimal to source only 
from a foreign supplier that has a higher expected sourcing cost. This finding goes against the 
common practice of low-cost sourcing and suggests that managers should think more deeply 
about their sourcing policies under exchange-rate uncertainty. Moreover, our results show that 
the firm may reserve capacity only at the foreign supplier even if the expected operational cost 
(inclusive of production, transportation, duty, and localization expenses) is higher than the 
selling price. This result makes our finding associated with reserving capacity only at the more 
expensive supplier even more pronounced as it exemplifies the opportunity gains from the 
currency fluctuations.  
Third, we show that risk aversion makes dual sourcing more desirable. In particular, when 
the firm’s optimal policy is offshore sourcing in the risk-neutral setting, the introduction of risk 
aversion with a VaR requirement can trigger a policy switch to dual sourcing. Thus, under risk 
aversion, dual sourcing becomes more pronounced over single sourcing.  
Fourth, financial hedging can help eliminate the negative consequences of risk aversion and 
enable the firm to replicate the expected profit of the risk-neutral policies. Thus, the firm obtains 
the same set of five potentially optimal global sourcing policies in the presence of financial 
hedging. As a consequence, our policy findings are robust as they continue to hold under risk 
aversion and financial hedging.  
In addition to the above four contributions, our study provides insights into the impact of 
exchange-rate volatility on capacity reservation decisions. While the reserved capacity of the 
foreign supplier increases with volatility, capacity reservation decisions at the domestic supplier 
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can exhibit both an increasing and decreasing behavior. The conditions for the increasing and 
decreasing behavior are described under increasing exchange-rate uncertainty. Greater degrees of 
exchange-rate volatility do not always increase domestic capacity and do not regularly lead to 
higher flexibility. The firm may prefer to give up some of its allocation flexibility under policy 
DE, for example, by reducing its domestic capacity and capitalizing more on the foreign capacity. 
We have stated earlier that our work is motivated from the challenges faced by a specialty 
furniture maker. Our work demonstrates numerically how our model applies to the products of 
this firm. The firm’s prior sourcing decisions have ignored exchange-rate uncertainty, and have 
relied on utilizing a single supplier which is selected based on the lower cost. Incorporating 
exchange-rate uncertainty, our analysis shows that, when unit capacity reservation costs are 
smaller relative to the selling price as in the case of book carts, the firm prefers dual sourcing 
policies. When the unit capacity reservation cost is higher in comparison to the selling price as in 
the case of office desks and chairs, then a single-sourcing policy is desired. The firm now 
engages in dual sourcing for some of its products. We also report that both the rationing dual 
sourcing policy and dual sourcing policy with excess capacity are currently being utilized among 
the firm’s product portfolio. 
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CHAPTER 3: GLOBAL SOURCING UNDER YIELD UNCERTAINTY 
3.1 Introduction 
Coffee is one of the most popular beverages worldwide. The United States Department of 
Agriculture, forecasts the global annual coffee consumption at a record of 150.8 million bags (60 
kilograms, or approximately 132 pounds, per each bag) in its 2016/2017 forecast review1. While 
the coffee consumption is expected to continue to experience a steady growth, the consumers 
seem to increasingly demand high quality coffees around the world (Stabiner 2015, Craymer 
2015). There are a few coffee roasters in the United States which have already targeted this 
trending specialty coffee market, and are believed to be reshaping the coffee industry (Strand 
2015). The pioneer coffee roasters in the specialty coffee industry are Intelligentsia, Stumptown, 
and Counter Culture, which are called the Big Three of the Third-Wave Coffee, an initiative 
aimed at enhancing the quality of the produced coffee. Third Wave Coffee is considered as a 
specialty food product rather than a commodity. This is exemplified by the recent acquisitions of 
Intelligentsia and Stumptown by Peet’s Coffee at high prices, indicating an increase in the 
interest and practice in the specialty coffee market.  
In order to be able to offer superior coffee, these leading coffee roasters rely heavily on direct 
communication and close collaboration with the growers, which has given rise to a new form of 
sourcing practices called Direct Trade. Through Direct Trade, specialty coffee roasters can 
improve the quality of coffee beans by providing guidance and resources to the growers, and 
closely monitoring the growth of coffee beans and the harvesting process. Direct Trade is 
different from the traditional sourcing practice in the coffee industry which involves sourcing 
through coffee traders and exchanges as described in Figure 3.1. 
                                                 
1 http://apps.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/circulars/coffee.pdf 
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Figure 3.1. A schematic view of the traditional coffee supply chain. Source: Forbes.com. 
 
Inspired by the business model of the Big Three, a growing number of coffee roasters have 
started to leave the coffee exchanges and engage in Direct Trade. The departure from the 
traditional sourcing practice results in two separate coffee markets according to Wernau (2015), 
which we refer to as specialty (superior) coffee market, and commercial (inferior) coffee market. 
Our study is motivated by the recent trend of engaging in Direct Trade in the coffee industry. We 
focus on the specialty coffee supply chain where a coffee roaster adopts Direct Trade sourcing in 
order to target the quality-sensitive segment of consumers. Our analysis captures the interaction 
between the specialty coffee market and the commercial coffee market from the consumer choice 
perspective. We explore the impact of the supply uncertainty caused by engaging in Direct 
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Trade, and the uncertainty in the global commercial coffee market on the coffee roaster’s 
sourcing and pricing decisions. 
We provide insights into managing a specialty-coffee supply chain, which is an emerging 
phenomenon in the coffee industry, by addressing the following research questions: 
1. What is the impact of yield uncertainty stemming from Direct Trade on sourcing 
decisions of agribusinesses in a specialty coffee supply chain?  
2. How does the uncertainty in the commercial coffee market influence the coffee roaster’s 
level of investment in Direct Trade? 
3. How should a coffee roaster set the price for its specialty product based on the market 
price of the commercial coffee considering the consumer choice between the specialty 
and the commercial coffees? 
4. What is the impact of correlation between the specialty and the global commercial crop 
supply? 
Our study makes three contributions: First, to the best of our knowledge, our study is the first 
to develop a mathematical model capturing the main driving forces that influence the sourcing 
and pricing decisions in a specialty coffee supply chain. Incorporating the uncertainty in 
commercial coffee market as well as the variation in the Direct Trade yield into our model, we 
identify the optimal sourcing and pricing decisions of a specialty coffee roaster.  
Second, we show that a conservative sourcing policy may emerge as an effective policy 
under uncertainty, which would never be optimal in a deterministic setting. Our analysis 
demonstrates that either yield uncertainty or the fluctuations in the price of the commercial 
coffee may lead to a conservative sourcing policy where the coffee roaster intentionally 
underinvests in Direct Trade. This sourcing policy—which we refer to as the “underinvestment” 
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policy—can be considered as an operational hedging approach that helps the coffee roaster 
mitigate the negative consequences of the potential uncertainties. This result complements the 
earlier literature on global production planning, which identifies “production hedging” 
(deliberately producing less than demand) as an effective operational hedging policy (Kazaz et 
al. 2005, Park et al. 2016) under exchange-rate uncertainty in manufacturing settings. Our work 
shows a similar hedging approach for agribusinesses that operate under uncertainty pertaining to 
crop yield and market-price of a competing inferior product. In our findings, the emerged 
hedging policy can be interpreted as “capacity hedging” which involves underinvesting in 
agricultural farmland. Under this conservative behavior, the firm utilizes its pricing lever in order 
to shrink the market size at all realizations of the two random variables. Thus, the market size 
served is smaller than what the firm would have served in the absence of a supply constraint.  
Our third contribution relates with the impact of correlation between the specialty Direct 
Trade supply and the global supply of commercial coffee beans. We observe that the specialty 
crop supply would typically be negatively correlated with the market price of the commercial 
coffee. Our analysis suggests that higher degrees of negative correlation between the two random 
variables representing the specialty yield and the price of the commercial coffee improve the 
expected profit, and therefore, the specialty coffee roaster benefits from investing in agricultural 
regions where the specialty coffee yield becomes more strongly correlated with the global 
commercial yield.  
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes how our work 
departs from the current literature. Section 3.3 introduces our model, Section 3.4 presents its 
analysis; it identifies the optimal investment and pricing decisions, characterizes the 
underinvestment policy, and examines the impact of uncertainty on Direct Trade investment 
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decisions. Section 3.5 provides concluding remarks. All proofs are relegated to the online 
appendix. 
3.2 Literature Review 
This study examines the sourcing and pricing decisions of an agricultural firm under random 
yield and market-price for a similar (and inferior) product. We begin our discussion with yield 
and supply uncertainty. The supply chain management literature on sourcing strategies under 
supply/yield uncertainty is extensive. Yano and Lee (1995) and Tang (2006) provide a 
comprehensive review of the literature on managing yield/supply risk in manufacturing 
environments. Our study is related with the stream of research in operations/supply chain 
management literature which explores operational hedging strategies for managing supply 
uncertainty. In this literature, supply diversification is proven to be an effective approach toward 
mitigating supply risk. Gerchak and Parlar (1990), Parlar and Wang (1993), Anupindi and Akella 
(1993), and more recently, Tomlin and Wang (2005), Dada et al. (2007), Burke et al. (2009), Jain 
et al. (2014), and Tan et al. (2016) demonstrate the benefits of dual/multiple sourcing in 
managing supply uncertainty. However, in these studies the firm (buyer) does not have pricing 
power, and thus, the selling price is considered as exogenous. In addition, our work characterizes 
an operational hedging policy that differs from supply diversification and involves underserving 
the target market by lowering the level of investment in farmland capacity in the presence of 
monopolistic power. 
There are a few studies that consider a firm’s price-setting ability in the presence of supply 
uncertainty. Li and Zheng (2006), and Feng (2010) investigate joint inventory and pricing 
policies in multi-period manufacturing settings. Kazaz and Webster (2015) consider a single-
period Newsvendor model under supply and demand uncertainty and explore how the source of 
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uncertainty influence the tractability of the problem and the optimal decisions. Our study departs 
from these papers by considering the consumer choice between two products and the effect of 
uncertainty in the competing market on sourcing, production and pricing decisions of an 
agricultural processor. 
The most related body of research to our work includes studies that focus on agricultural 
supply chains. Within this stream of research, a common sourcing framework is procuring 
agricultural products through lease contracts (Kazaz 2004, Kazaz and Webster 2011) by which 
an agricultural firm leases farmland at the beginning of the growing season and harvests the 
realized crop yield at the end of the growing season. Our study uses a similar framework in 
modeling sourcing decisions. However, it departs from the earlier studies. Kazaz (2004), Kazaz 
and Webster (2011) examine the impact of yield-dependent trading cost on sourcing and 
production planning of an agricultural firm which sells a single product. Our study, however, 
considers two products—one superior and one inferior product— with two associated consumer 
segments.  Although our main focus is exploring the sourcing and pricing decisions of the 
superior product, our analysis captures the consumer’s choice between the two products, which 
affects the demand for the superior product. 
Noparumpa et al. (2011) examine the interrelationships among downward substitution, price 
setting, and fruit trading under supply and quality uncertainty. While we do not incorporate 
quality uncertainty into our model, we capture the impact of uncertainty in the price of an 
inferior product determined by the global market on sourcing and pricing of a superior product 
by an agricultural processor. 
Our model’s structure is similar to that of Noparumpa et al. (2015). Our study, however, 
differs from their work in terms of the decisions, and the environmental factors influencing 
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sourcing and pricing decisions. They investigate a winemaker’s decisions on how to allocate a 
single product between advance selling in the form of financial futures contract and retail 
distribution. Our study, on the other hand, explores the impact of the interaction between two 
different consumer segments on allocation decisions of an agricultural processor. Our study also 
captures the farmland investment decisions made by the processor prior to the selling season and 
incorporates the yield uncertainty stemming from such a sourcing practice. 
There is a recent stream of literature that considers simultaneous sourcing of agricultural 
inputs (Boyabatli et al. 2011, Boyabatli 2015). However, this body of research investigates 
multi-product supply management where the crop yield is assumed to be deterministic using two 
or more different agricultural inputs. Our study is structurally different from these papers as we 
emphasize the effective policies for sourcing a single agricultural input under yield and market-
price uncertainty. 
In sum, motivated by an emerging agribusiness practice in the coffee industry, our study 
features a new agricultural supply chain framework. In order to target the fast-growing niche 
segment of quality-sensitive consumers, a small number of coffee roasters have drastically 
changed their sourcing policy and engaged in Direct Trade, which in turn has led to exposure to 
supply risk. Our study investigates the sourcing and pricing decisions of such agricultural 
processors and provides insights into managing the supply chain of the associated agricultural 
products. 
3.3 Model 
In this section, we describe the problem and present the model developed to explore the 
global sourcing decisions of a firm operating in an agricultural environment where yield 
uncertainty influences the firm’s crop supply. The firm sells a finished product (i.e., roasted 
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coffee) which requires processing an agricultural product (i.e., coffee green beans) as input to be 
converted to the final product. The main target market of the firm (processor) is the quality-
sensitive segment of consumers who prefer specialty coffees and are willing to pay a premium 
price (hereafter “specialty segment”). The processor (coffee roaster) engages in Direct Trade 
(DT) in order to be able to source quality coffee beans and offer superior processed (roasted) 
coffee to the specialty segment. An inferior alternative for consumers is the Non-Direct-Trade 
(NDT) roasted coffee which is extensively offered by a large number of coffee roasters, and is 
desired by a massive population of consumers who consider coffee as a necessity product. As 
such, we consider the NDT coffee as a commercial/commodity product whose price is 
exogenously determined by the enormous global market. 
We develop a two-stage stochastic model with recourse to examine the processor’s sourcing 
and pricing decisions in the presence of yield uncertainty of the DT crop and price uncertainty of 
the commercial coffee. The operating environment and the sequence of decisions can be 
described as follows: Prior to the growing season, which corresponds to stage 1 of our model, the 
processor engages in DT by going straight to the growers and leasing farmland, denoted Q. 
Along with the leasing decision, the processor provides instructions to the growers in order to 
ensure the desired quality of the specialty coffee crop. This initial investment costs l per unit of 
farmland. At the end of the growing season, corresponding to stage 2 of our model, the processor 
realizes (1) the DT crop yield to be processed and sold as a specialty coffee, and (2) the global 
market price for the commercial coffee. The DT crop supply harvested at the end of the growing 
season is expressed as Qy (stochastically proportional to the lease quantity) where y ∈ [yl, yh] is 
the realization of a random variable Y with mean ȳ , standard deviation σy, probability density 
function (pdf) g(y), and cumulative distribution function (cdf) G(y). The market (retail) price of 
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the commercial coffee, Φ, is considered random with realization φ ∈ [φl, φh], meanϕ , variance 
σφ, pdf h(φ) and cdf H(φ). The uncertainty in the price of the commercial coffee represents the 
uncertainty in the commercial market which stems from the fluctuations in the global yield of the 
coffee beans and other uncertain economic factors. In our base model, the DT crop yield and the 
price of the commercial coffee are considered as independent random variables, because the 
amount of crop yield from DT is assumed to be relatively small compared to the amount of the 
commodity coffee’s global yield, which implies negligible correlation between the two random 
variables (Y, Φ). We later relax this assumption and analyze the impact of correlation on the 
investment decision and the expected profit of the processor. We also assume throughout the 
essay that the support of Y and Φ remain unchanged as the level of uncertainty associated with 
each variable alters (except for the case of no uncertainty where the random variable is replaced 
with its mean). 
Upon the realizations of the DT yield and the market price of the commercial coffee, the 
processor uses its monopolistic power within the specialty segment, and sets the selling price, 
denoted p, for its offered specialty coffee targeted toward this segment. An equivalent 
interpretation is that the processor determines the quantity of the specialty coffee to be sold, 
denoted q, in this stage. The processing (roasting) cost is r per unit of product. The extra DT crop 
is processed and salvaged at s where s ≥ r (i.e., the salvage value of the processed crop is higher 
than the processing cost), and the shortage in the DT supply cannot be compensated by sourcing 
from the spot market, as the offered coffee would not be considered a DT product. We note that 
our conclusions do not depend on the inequality r ≤ s; if r > s, then the firm salvages prior to 
processing with corresponding adjustment to relevant expressions, leading to no change in the 
structure of the profit function. Figure 3.2 illustrates the sequence of decisions and realizations. 
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Figure 3.2. Sequence of decisions and realizations. 
 
The first-stage objective function in our model maximizes the expected profit, denoted Π(Q), 
from the leasing decision Q in the presence of yield (Y) and market-price of commercial coffee 
(Φ) uncertainty. It can be expressed as follows: 
( ) ( )*,0max , ,YQ Q lQ E Q YπΦ≥  ∏ = − + Φ   
where ( )* , ,Q yπ ϕ is the optimal second-stage profit for a pair of realized values y of Y and φ of 
Φ. The second-stage profit depends on the pricing decision of the processor, which affects the 
demand for the specialty product.  
We utilize a multinomial logit (MNL) model to capture the consumer choice between the DT 
specialty (superior) coffee and the NDT commercial (inferior) coffee based on the prices and the 
consumer’s valuation for each product. At the beginning of the selling season (end of the 
growing season), which corresponds to the second stage of our model, the consumers of the 
specialty segment consider three options: (1) purchase specialty coffee at price p, (2) purchase 
commercial coffee at price φ, (3) do not purchase. 
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The utility associated with each purchasing alternative is driven by the difference between 
the valuation of the consumer for that particular product and the price of the product. 
Specifically, the consumer’s valuation for the specialty coffee is Vs = vs + εs where εs is a random 
variable with E[εs] = 0, and the consumer surplus – the difference between valuation and the 
price – determines the random utility of purchasing the specialty product, i.e., Us = Vs − p = vs + 
εs − p. The average utility of purchasing the specialty product among consumers is then us = 
E[Us] = vs − p. 
Similarly, the random utility of purchasing the commercial coffee can be expressed as Uc = 
Vc − φ = vc + εc − φ, where εc is a random variable with E[εc] = 0. Thus, the average utility of 
purchasing the commercial product is uc = E [Uc] = vc − φ. In order to reflect the preferences of 
the specialty segment, we assume vs > vc. 
Finally, the random utility of no-purchase option is U0 = ε0, which results in zero average 
utility of this alternative among consumers, as ε0 is a random variable with E[ε0] = 0. 
Among the three options, the consumers of the specialty segment choose the one associated 
with the highest utility. Therefore, the probability of purchasing the specialty product is  
[ ] [ ]0 0max{ , } max{ , }s c c s sP U U U P v pε ε ε> = − < −  
Assuming that εs, εc, and ε0 are i.i.d. Gumbel random variables with zero mean and scale 
parameter β, we note that max{εc, ε0}is a Gumbel random variable with E[max{εc, ε0}] = β ln 2, 
and scale parameter β, and max{εc, ε0} − εs is a logistic random variable. As a result, the 
probability of purchasing the specialty coffee is 
[ ]
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which corresponds to the fraction of consumers in the specialty segment who purchase the 
specialty coffee. Thus, the demand for the specialty coffee is determined by the MNL model as 
follows: 
[ ]
( )/
0 ( )/ ( )/( | ) max{ , } 1
s
c s
v p
s c v v p
eq p MP U U U M
e e
β
ϕ β βϕ
−
− −= > = + +
   (3.1) 
where M is the specialty segment size (i.e., the maximum consumer population who may 
potentially buy the specialty product). 
Consequently, the inverted demand function can be expressed as: 
( | ) ln
( )s
M qp q v
k q
ϕ β
ϕ
 −
= +  
 
     (3.2) 
where  
( )/( ) 1 cvk e ϕ βϕ −= +      (3.3) 
The second-stage optimal profit can then be expressed as: 
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is the second-stage profit function. 
3.4 Analysis 
3.4.1 Pricing and Processing Decisions 
We begin our analysis by investigating the pricing and processing decisions of the firm after 
realization of the DT crop yield and the market price for the commercial coffee (i.e., stage 2 of 
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our model). We determine the optimal price (p*(φ, y)) for the specialty DT product, which 
provides the corresponding quantity to be sold (q*(φ, y)). These results utilize the Lambert W 
function (Coreless et al. 1996). All proofs are relegated to the appendix.  
Proposition 3.1. Let 
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. 
The value of α(φ) is the optimal fraction of the specialty segment to be targeted by the 
processor, and the value of Mα(φ) is the optimal market size to be served (optimal demand). We 
observe that the processor sets different selling prices for the specialty coffee contingent upon 
whether the crop supply (Qy) is sufficient for serving the optimal market size. 
The next proposition shows how the optimal price of the specialty coffee (optimal “specialty 
price”, hereafter) changes with the realized market price of the commercial coffee (realized 
“commercial price”, hereafter). Throughout this essay, we use “increase”, “decrease”, and 
“concave” in their weak sense.  
Proposition 3.2. The optimal specialty price (p*(φ, y)) increases in the realized commercial 
price (φ). However, the magnitude of the increase is less than that of φ, i.e., 0 < ∂p*(φ, y)/∂φ < 1. 
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The processor charges a higher specialty price at higher levels of realized commercial price. 
We note that the demand for the specialty coffee depends on both the specialty price set by the 
processor (p) and the realized commercial price determined by the global market (φ). Proposition 
3.2 states that the optimal specialty price takes the same direction as the realized commercial 
price. That is, if the commercial price increases (decreases), the specialty price should increase 
(decrease) as well. Consequently, they have counter-balancing effects on the demand. The next 
proposition identifies the dominant effect and clarifies how the optimal target market size 
changes with respect to the realized commercial price. 
Proposition 3.3. The optimal fraction of the specialty segment to be targeted by the processor 
(α(φ)) and thus the optimal processing quantity (q*(φ, y)) increases in the realized commercial 
price (φ). 
Even though the processor raises the specialty price as commercial price increases, its effect 
on the market allocation is dominated by the effect of commercial price. Consequently, the 
optimal targeted fraction of the specialty segment expands if the realized commercial price 
increases. This implies that the processor benefits from targeting a larger specialty market while 
charging a higher price as the commercial coffee becomes more expensive. 
3.4.2 Investment Decision 
We next explore the processor’s investment decision at the beginning of the growing season 
(i.e. Stage 1 of our model). From Proposition 3.1, we use the optimal second-stage profit 
expressions to write the first-stage expected profit function as follows: 
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where ( ){ }( ) , | ( )U Q y Qy Mϕ α ϕ= < , and ( ){ }( ) , | ( )O Q y Qy Mϕ α ϕ= ≥ . 
The following proposition indicates that there is always a unique optimal amount of farmland 
to be leased for any given probability distributions of yield and commercial price. 
Proposition 3.4. (a) The first-stage expected profit function Π(Q) is concave in the leasing 
amount Q, and the optimal amount of farmland to lease, (denoted Q*, is the unique solution to 
the below first order condition (FOC): 
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(b) The optimal expected profit is 
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Note that the main objective of engaging in DT is to serve the quality-sensitive specialty 
segment, because sourcing through DT allows the processor to ensure the desired quality by 
providing instructions while closely collaborating with the growers. The growers, on the other 
hand, have to have sufficient incentives to take part in DT. The processors typically pays the 
farmer a premium price2 in order to ensure the availability of farmland in the long term. As a 
result, sourcing through DT is costly for the processors, which creates a downward pressure on 
the leasing decision and prevents the processor from overinvesting in DT. On the other hand, the 
flexibility to charge a premium price for the specialty coffee segment creates an incentive to 
increase investment in farmland associated with DT. The FOC (3.6) captures the tradeoff in these 
opposing driving forces, and it helps determine the optimal leasing quantity. The two terms on 
the left-hand side express the marginal revenue of leasing farmland when the crop supply falls 
                                                 
2 Intelligentsia Coffee website (http://www.intelligentsiacoffee.com/content/direct-trade) 
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short of the optimal target market (i.e., Qy ≤ Mα(φ)) and when there is sufficient supply (i.e., Qy 
> Mα(φ)), respectively, while the right-hand side is the (expected) marginal cost of sourcing and 
processing the crop supply of coffee beans.  
Before proceeding with the optimal policy structure pertaining to the leasing decision of the 
processor, we establish two benchmarks that serve beneficial in characterizing optimal behavior. 
We begin with the first benchmark associated with the amount of farmland that would be leased 
in the absence of uncertainty. It should be observed that when there is no uncertainty associated 
with the DT crop supply nor with the commercial market, the processor invests in the exact 
amount of farmland yielding the amount of supply that fulfills the optimal target market ( )Mα ϕ . 
Our first benchmark, QD, establishes the lease amount of farmland for the processor that ignores 
uncertainty by setting ( )Qy Mα ϕ= , and thus, 
( ) /DQ M yα ϕ= . 
We establish a second benchmark that helps characterize the processor’s potentially 
conservative behavior. It should be observed that the lowest market size occurs when the 
commercial price random variable takes its lowest value at the lower support of its pdf, φl. It 
should also be observed that the highest crop yield for the processor is observed when the 
random yield variable takes its highest value over the support of its pdf, yh. Our second 
benchmark establishes the minimum amount of leased farmland that results in just sufficient crop 
yield at its highest realization (yh) to cover the minimum market demand (equal to Mα(φl)). We 
describe this benchmark as:  
QT = Mα(φl) / yh. 
Remark 3.1. QT < QD. 
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We note that, for Q < QT, the processor is guaranteed to operate under limited supply. This 
can be seen from the fact that the maximum realized crop supply that can be attained at yh is less 
than the minimum market demand at φl, i.e., Qyh < Mα(φl) for Q < QT. Thus, when Q < QT, the 
firm operates under limited supply at all realizations of crop yield and market price uncertainty.  
Next, we analyze the conditions leading to the conservative behavior as described above. We 
then explore how the processor’s investment decision is affected by the variation in specialty 
crop yield stemming from DT and the fluctuations in the price of the commercial coffee. 
3.4.3 Underinvestment 
In order to analyze the impact of uncertainties associated with the specialty crop supply and 
the commercial price, we first identify an optimal sourcing policy under yield and commercial 
price uncertainty, which would never be adopted if the yield and the commercial price were 
deterministic. Specifically, under yield and commercial price uncertainty, our analysis shows that 
the processor can deliberately underinvest in DT under certain conditions. We describe this 
sourcing behavior as the “underinvestment” policy because the processor reduces the leasing 
amount of farmland to the extent that it ensures at any realization of the yield and the 
commercial price random variables, (1) it increases the selling price of the specialty coffee in 
order to reduce the demand for specialty coffee and match the realized crop supply; and (2) it 
serves a market demand that is smaller than what it would have served under an unconstrained 
optimal price. In other words, by lowering the investment level below a threshold according to 
the underinvestment policy, the processor chooses to always operate under supply shortage, and 
it never fully utilizes the potential specialty coffee demand at the realized market-price φ, but 
rather uses its pricing flexibility to reduce the market demand to match the realized crop supply. 
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It is worth noting that when there is no uncertainty associated with the DT crop supply or the 
commercial market, the processor invests in the exact amount of farmland equal to QD, yielding 
the amount of supply that fulfills the target specialty coffee demand that is equal to ( )Mα ϕ . 
Therefore, the processor has no incentive to underinvest in DT when the supply and the 
commercial market conditions are deterministic. Our analysis, however, shows that the 
underinvestment policy can be optimal under either of yield and commercial price uncertainty.  
In the global manufacturing network literature, Kazaz et al. (2005) are the first to introduce 
an effective operational hedging policy –called “production hedging”—that involves producing 
less than the total demand and thus underserving the markets. Park et al. (2016) build on this 
work by showing that the production hedging policy is a viable risk mitigation approach. While 
in both of these studies exchange-rate uncertainty is the main driver of underserving the markets, 
our work indicates that yield uncertainty as well as price uncertainty in the competing market can 
result in a similar operational policy in an agricultural environment. The underinvestment policy 
explored in this essay can be considered as a “capacity hedging” policy where the low amount of 
leased farmland proactively restricts the processing (production) quantity such that the firm 
serves a market demand for specialty coffee that is strictly less than what it would have served 
under an unconstrained optimal price, regardless of the realizations of yield and the commercial 
price. 
We first identify the condition that leads to underinvestment and then explore the impact of 
the uncertainty associated with the specialty yield and the commercial market on the processor’s 
investment policy. 
Proposition 3.5. Let A represent the two-dimensional support of y and φ (i.e., 
( ){ }, | ,l h l hA y y y yϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ= ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ). 
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(a) It is optimal for the processor to underinvest in DT if and only if the below condition 
holds 
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(b) When it is optimal for the processor to underinvest, the optimal leasing quantity (QU*) is 
the unique solution to the below FOC: 
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(c) The expected profit for the underinvestment policy can be expressed as: 
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(d) The optimal amount of farmland under the underinvestment policy is less than the 
minimum farmland space; specifically, QU* < QT.  
Proposition 3.5 establishes the conditions under which the processor is better off by lowering 
its investment level such that it ensures the specialty crop supply falls short of the optimal market 
size to be targeted by the processor at any realizations of the yield and the commercial price. 
Note that according to Proposition 3.3, the smallest portion of the specialty segment is targeted 
by the processor when the commercial price is realized at its lowest level (φl). In addition, we 
observe that when the processor faces supply shortage, it charges a market clearing price. 
Condition (3.8) implies that the processor benefits from operating under supply shortage and 
charging market clearing price than investing more on the DT when the marginal cost of 
additional supply (right-hand side of the inequality) overweighs its expected marginal revenue 
(left-hand side of the inequality) even when the highest possible realization of the DT supply 
(Qyh) can barely fulfill the lowest possible level of optimal demand (i.e., Mα(φl)). Proposition 
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3.5(d), along with Remark 3.1, indicates that the optimal leasing quantity under underinvestment 
policy is significantly lower than the optimal leasing quantity under deterministic setting.  
Next, we examine the impact of yield and commercial price uncertainty on the investment 
policy. 
3.4.3.1 Impact of uncertainties on the investment policy and profit 
In this section, we investigate how the investment policy is affected by the yield variation 
and the commercial price fluctuations. We particularly study whether these uncertainties 
encourage or hinder underinvestment policy, and whether their effects reinforce or 
counterbalance the opposing forces in the optimal lease decision. 
Proposition 3.6. (a) If for a given level of commercial price uncertainty (yield uncertainty), the 
underinvestment policy is optimal under two-point distribution of random yield (random 
commercial price), there exists a threshold for the degree of yield uncertainty (commercial price 
uncertainty) above which underinvestment is optimal. (b) When the underinvestment policy 
becomes optimal at a higher level of yield uncertainty (commercial price uncertainty), the 
expected profit decreases compared to the case with lower levels of yield uncertainty 
(commercial price uncertainty) where the underinvestment policy is not optimal. 
The above proposition implies that both types of uncertainties faced by the processor leads to 
the underinvestment policy becoming a more viable sourcing policy. Specifically, as long as the 
underinvestment policy is optimal under the highest level of yield or commercial price variation 
(under a two-point distribution), the processor eventually implements the underinvestment 
policy. The firm continues to implement this policy as the variation increases. In addition, the 
fact that underinvestment is associated with a lower expected profit suggests that this policy is 
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adopted under unfavorable circumstances caused by the uncertainty in yield and commercial 
price.  
We note that, under the underinvestment policy, the marginal revenue in the left-hand side of 
(3.9) decreases as yield or commercial price variation increases. Consequently, at higher levels 
of yield or commercial price uncertainty, the processor eventually restricts its DT investment 
amount to such low levels that result in serving a specialty coffee demand that is strictly less than 
what it would have served under an unconstrained optimal market demand. Essentially, the 
underinvestment policy allows the processor to exercise its monopolistic power over the entire 
specialty supply (by charging a market-clearing price) and at the same time save on the 
opportunity cost of facing overage at higher investment levels, as the operating environment 
becomes more uncertain. 
Now that we observe the variation in the specialty yield as well as the uncertainty in the 
commercial market encourage the adoption of the underinvestment policy, we investigate which 
uncertainty is the main driver of this behavior. Are both yield and commercial price uncertainties 
necessary for the underinvestment policy to become an effective sourcing policy? Can either of 
these uncertainties by itself result in the underinvestment policy?  
Proposition 3.7. Either yield uncertainty or commercial price uncertainty by itself can lead to 
the underinvestment policy. 
Our analysis demonstrates that either source of uncertainty in this operating environment can 
cause the processor to adopt the underinvestment policy. In other words, neither yield nor 
commercial price uncertainty can be considered necessary or the primary driver of the 
underinvestment policy; they both contribute significantly to the optimality of this sourcing 
policy. 
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The next proposition identifies how yield and commercial price uncertainty affects the DT 
investment level of the processor when implementing the underinvestment policy. 
Proposition 3.8. When the processor adopts the underinvestment policy, as the degree of yield 
uncertainty or commercial price uncertainty increases, (a) the optimal leasing quantity 
decreases, and (b) the expected profit decreases.   
The above proposition, along with the findings in propositions 3.6 and 3.7, suggest that the 
optimal leasing amount and the expected profit exhibit a diminishing behavior under an 
increasingly uncertain operating environment. This is important because we note that when the 
underinvestment policy is not optimal, the analytical investigation is inconclusive about the exact 
behavior of the leasing quantity and the expected profit with respect to uncertainty. Propositions 
3.6 and 3.7 imply that higher degrees of uncertainty eventually lead to the underinvestment 
policy with lower levels of DT investment and expected profit. Proposition 3.8 complements 
these findings by analytically showing that when the underinvestment policy is optimal, 
additional uncertainty reduces the optimal amount of investment and the expected profit. We 
can, therefore, conclude that the leasing quantity and the expected profit decreases in yield and 
commercial price uncertainty from a general perspective. 
Next, we relax the independence assumption between the two random variables describing 
the yield and market price uncertainty, and explore the impact of correlation between the crop 
supply obtained through DT and the price of the commercial coffee set by the global market. 
3.4.3.2 Impact of correlation 
It is potentially likely to have negative correlation between the specialty coffee (DT) yield 
and the price of the commercial coffee. This is because the global yield of the commercial coffee 
beans negatively impacts the commercial coffee price, and therefore, any (positive) correlation 
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between the specialty yield and the global yield results in a negative correlation between the 
random yield and the random commercial price. In order to study the impact of correlation, we 
compare two cases (in which the support for the two random variables Y and Φ remain 
unchanged): (1) perfect correlation (denoted by the subscript “pc”) and (2) less-than-perfect 
correlation (including independence; denoted by the subscript “lc”). 
In case of perfect (negative) correlation, the commercial price is deterministically related 
with the yield. Therefore, we consider the realization of the commercial price (φ) as a decreasing 
function of the realization of DT yield (y) (i.e., φ(y) is a decreasing function of y) such that φ(yl) 
= φh, and φ(yh) = φl. Consequently, the optimal fraction of the specialty segment to be targeted by 
the processor (i.e., Mα(φ(y))) becomes a decreasing function of y. Therefore, for any given 
leasing quantity (Q), there exists a threshold, denoted by ˆ( )y Q , for which we have: 
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The second-stage optimal profit can be expressed as in Proposition 3.1 (except for φ is 
replaced with φ(y)), and we can write the first-stage expected profit function as follows: 
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In the case of less-than-perfect correlation, Φ(y) denotes the random commercial price with 
E[Φ(y)] = φ(y) for a given realization of y. Accordingly, the first-stage expected profit function 
can be expressed as: 
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where ( ){ }( ) , | ( )lcU Q y Qy Mϕ α ϕ= < , and ( ){ }( ) , | ( )lcO Q y Qy Mϕ α ϕ= ≥ when there is a less-
than-perfect correlation between y and φ, and ω(y,φ) is the joint distribution of Φ and Y. 
The next proposition provides insights into how the correlation between the specialty yield 
and the commercial price affects the sourcing policy. 
Proposition 3.9. (a) If the underinvestment policy is optimal under perfect correlation, it is also 
optimal under less-than-perfect correlation (including the case of independence between the two 
random variables), and (b) When the underinvestment policy is optimal under all levels of 
correlation, the expected profit is higher under the perfect correlation than that under less-than-
perfect correlation (including the case of independent random variables), for a given leasing 
quantity. 
This result implies that the underinvestment policy is less likely to be optimal under perfect 
correlation than under less-than-perfect correlation. The finding suggests that the correlation 
between the yield and the commercial price allows the processor to invest more freely in DT. 
Recall that propositions 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8 imply that either type of uncertainties faced by the 
processor is undesirable in this environment and negatively affects the processor’s expected 
profit and the overall investment amount. Proposition 3.9 suggests that correlation mitigates the 
adversarial effects of the variation in the specialty yield and the uncertainty in the commercial 
market, and it improves the expected profit from a general perspective. We note that, as the 
degree of negative correlation increases, the set of possible pairs of yield and commercial price 
realizations shrinks, and thus, the operating environment becomes “less uncertain”. Therefore, it 
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is conceivable to infer that correlation raises the level of optimal investment and improves the 
profit.  
The consequence of this result is that it is beneficial for the coffee roasters to invest more in 
the agricultural regions with the crop yield that is more strongly and positively correlated with 
the global commercial coffee yield. It is well known that Brazil has the highest share of coffee 
beans supply in the global market. Our analysis suggests that investing in agricultural regions 
with strong correlation with Brazil’s coffee yield –as much as the geographical properties 
necessary for high-quality coffee allows— is advantageous to the DT coffee roasters. 
3.5 Conclusions and Managerial Insights 
This essay examines sourcing and pricing decisions of an agricultural processor under yield 
uncertainty of the agricultural input required for the offered specialty product and the price 
uncertainty of the competing commercial product. Our study is motivated by a recent trend in the 
coffee industry and makes several contributions. 
First, we develop an analytical model which captures a trending supply chain framework 
where Direct Trade is an emerging sourcing practice. In order to target the quality-sensitive 
segment of consumers, a small number of coffee roasters have drastically changed their sourcing 
policy and engaged in Direct Trade, which involves direct communication and close 
collaboration with the growers, but results in increased exposure to crop supply risk. We identify 
the optimal sourcing decision under yield and commercial price uncertainty in the first stage of 
our proposed model, and the optimal pricing policy upon realizations of the specialty crop supply 
and the commercial product’s price. 
Second, we analyze the impact of yield and commercial price uncertainty, and demonstrate 
that a viable sourcing policy—which would never be adopted in a deterministic setting—
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emerges as a result of uncertainty. This policy requires the processor to deliberately underinvest 
in farmland of the specialty segment by lowering the level of investment in Direct Trade. This 
conservative sourcing policy highlights the significant impact of the variation in the specialty 
yield as well as the uncertainty in the commercial market on the investment decisions of the 
processor. 
Third, our analysis indicates that the correlation between the specialty yield and the global 
commercial yield improves the expected profit from a general perspective. Consequently, our 
study suggests that the specialty coffee roaster benefits from investing in agricultural regions 
where the yield is more strongly correlated with the global yield. 
In sum, our study provides insights into managing a specialty-coffee supply chain which is 
an emerging phenomenon in the coffee industry. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix to Chapter 2 
Proposition 2A.1. The first-stage expected profit function for offshore sourcing is concave in 
QF; (b) QF0 > 0.  
Proof. (a) The objective function in (2.4) can be written as follows: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
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0 0
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pD c e u e t q e p x q e f x dx g e de
τ
τ
τ
∞
∞
 Π = = − + 
 
+ − − + − − 
  
 
+ − − + + − 
  
∫ ∫
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. 
The first-order derivative of the profit function with respect to QF is: 
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k u e c e u e t p F Q g e de
Q
τ ∂ Π =   = − + + − − + + − ∂ ∫ . 
Recall that τ(QF) = (p[1 – F(QF)] – tF)/(cF – uF) and observe that ∂τ(QF)/∂QF = – pf(QF)/(cF – 
uF) ≤ 0.  Substituting τ(QF) into the above first-order derivative provides the first-order (FOC) 
condition in (2.9):  
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Because ∂τ(QF)/∂QF ≤ 0, the second-order derivative is non-positive and the objective 
function is concave in QF:  
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(b) From Assumption (A1) we have F F FE m k u e
+  − −  > 0. Observe that at QF = 0, we have 
τ(QF) = τ2 = (p − tF)/(cF − uF). We can see that the first-order derivative is positive at QF = 0 due 
to Assumption (A1):  
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and therefore, the solution to (2.9), denoted  QF0, is positive, i.e., QF0 > 0.  
Lemma 2A.1. In a Capacitated Newsvendor problem, the optimal solution is min (q*, Q) where 
q* is the optimal quantity for the typical newsvendor problem (without capacity constraints) and 
Q is the capacity level. 
Lemma 2A.2. For a newsvendor who is initially granted an initial inventory of qI, it is optimal 
to order (q*–qI)+ where q* is the optimal quantity for the typical newsvendor problem (no initial 
inventory). 
Proof. The problem becomes 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }* m  ) )ax ( (I I Iqq p c D p c E x q q cE q q xπ + +   = − − − − + − + −      
thus at the optimal solution, q + qI = q* as long as qI is smaller than q*. Otherwise, the 
newsvendor does not order any more inventory.  
Proof of Proposition 2.1. When there are two suppliers each associated with a different set of 
second-stage costs, and given capacity level (i.e., QH and QF), the firm prioritizes sourcing from 
the less costly supplier. Therefore, by Lemma 2A.1, qH*= min{QH, qH0} when mH ≥ mF and qF*= 
min{QF, qF0(e)} when mF > mH.  
If the desired level of second-stage production is not completed then the firm continues to 
source from the expensive supplier. We present the proof for qH*. The proof for qF* is analogous.  
76 
 
When mF > mH, if the foreign supplier is in short of capacity (i.e., min{QF, qF0(e)} = QF )), 
we know from Lemma 2A.2 that the domestic source can still be utilized as long as qH0 > QF = 
qF*. In this case, the optimal production quantity would be (qH0 – QF )+ if there were no capacity 
constraints. It follows that qH* = min{QH , (qH0 – QF)+} when QH restricts the production quantity. 
 
Proposition 2A.2. The first-stage expected profit function in region R1 is jointly concave in (QH, 
QF). 
Proof. The profit function in region R1 can be expressed as follows: 
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 (A.1) 
The first- and second-order derivatives of the profit function with respect to the capacity 
decisions are 
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Therefore, the determinant of the Hessian is positive, and thus the objective function is 
jointly concave in QH and QF in region R1.  
Proposition 2A.3. The first-stage expected profit function in region R2 is jointly concave in (QH, 
QF).  
Proof. The objective function in region R2 can be expressed as follows:  
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The first- and second-order derivatives of the profit function with respect to QH are 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
( )
( )
, 2
 
H
h
H
Q
H F
H H H H H F F F
H
e
H H H F F H F
Q
E Q Q R
k u c u t c e u e t g e de
Q
c u t c u Q t g e de
τ
τ
τ
τ
 ∂ Π   = − + + − − + + − + ∂
 + − − + + − + 
∫
∫
 
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
2
( )
, 2
1 ( )  0.
h
H
e
H F H
F F H H
H F FQ
E Q Q R pf Q
c u g e de pf Q G Q
Q c uτ
τ
 ∂ Π  −   = − = − − <   ∂ −  
∫  
Therefore, the objective function is concave in QH. We next show that the objective function 
is linear in QF. We have 
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which is constant and independent of QF and QH implying that  
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 = 0.  
The determinant of the Hessian for the objective function in R2 is 0, and thus the profit function 
is jointly concave in QH and QF in region R2. 
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Proposition 2A.4. The first-stage expected profit function in region R3 is jointly concave in (QH, 
QF).  
Proof. The objective function in region R3 can be expressed as follows:  
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The first- and second-order derivatives of the profit function with respect to the capacity 
decisions are:  
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. 
We note that the determinant of the Hessian is positive, leading to joint concavity in region 
R3.  
Lemma 2A.3. The objective function (2.4) is continuous. 
Proof. Note that 
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where by definition, τ (QH + QF = qH0) = τ1. This expression is equal to 
 ( ) ( ) ( )0 00( ), 2 | lim ,  , |H F H H F HH F HH F H F H FQ Q q Q Q qQ Q qE Q Q R E Q Q E Q Q++ = + =+ →     Π = Π = Π      
where the first equality holds by definition. Hence, the objective function is continuous along the 
boundary line of QH + QF = qH0. 
Similarly, along the boundary QF = qH0, 
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where by definition, τ (QF = qH0) = τ1. This expression is equal to 
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which implies that the objective function is continuous along this boundary line as well. As a 
result, the objective function is continuous everywhere. 
Lemma 2A.4. The profit function (2.4) is differentiable. 
Proof. Along the boundary line of QH + QF = qH0, the left derivative of the objective function 
with respect to QF is 
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where the last expression is the right derivative of objective function along the same boundary 
line.  
The left derivative of the objective function with respect to QH is 
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By rearranging the terms, we can rewrite the above derivative as follows: 
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By definition, the above derivative is equal to the right derivative of the objective function 
along the same boundary line. Thus, the objective function is differentiable along the boundary 
line of QH + QF = qH0. 
Along the boundary line of QF = qH0, the right derivative of the objective function with 
respect to QF is 
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where the last term is the left derivative of objective function along the same boundary line.  
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The right derivative of the profit function with respect to QH is
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By definition, the last expression is the left derivative of the objective function along that 
same boundary line. Therefore, the objective function is differentiable along the boundary line of 
QF = qH0 as well. In sum, the objective function is differentiable everywhere.  
Lemma 2A.5. Onshore sourcing (H) is the optimal policy if and only if QF0 < QH0. 
Proof. From Proposition 2A.2, we observe that in R1 the shadow price of QH monotonically 
decreases in QH as long as the total capacity is fixed. Note that this shadow price is positive at 
solution (QH = QF0, QF = 0) due to concavity of the profit function in QH. Moreover, the shadow 
price of QF in R1 remains the same as long as the total capacity is unchanged. Therefore, the 
solution (QH = QF0, QF = 0) dominates all solutions along the line QH + QF = QF0. However, this 
dominant solution corresponds to onshore sourcing which itself is dominated by the optimal 
onshore sourcing policy H (QH*= QH0, QF*= QF0). 
Consequently, below the line QH + QF = QH0, the optimal solution is the onshore sourcing 
policy H.  
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Proof of Proposition 2.2. From differentiability (lemmas 2A.3 and 2A.4) and piecewise 
concavity of the objective function (propositions 2A.2, 2A.3, and 2A.4), it follows that the 
objective function is jointly concave in QH and QF everywhere. 
Proof of Proposition 2.3. The first derivative of the objective function in R2 with respect to QF 
is given in (A.3) as follows: 
( )
( ) ( )
, 2H F
F F F H
F
E Q Q R
k u e E m m
Q
++
 ∂ Π
+   = − + −  ∂
 .       
The above derivative is constant and is independent of QF and QH. Therefore, the objective 
function in region R2 is linear in QF, which implies that there is no interior solution in this 
region.  
Proof of Proposition 2.4. We have already shown that the objective function in (2.4) is jointly 
concave in QH and QF, and that there is no interior solution in region R2 where the shadow price 
of QF is constant (independent of QH and QF). Therefore, the sign of this shadow price given in 
equation (A.3) leads us to the region where the optimal solution is located. If it is positive 
(negative), the optimal solution lies in region R3 (region R1) and that the optimal solution is an 
interior solution if the solution to system of equations in (2.13)(system of equations in (2.11)) 
exists. Suppose the shadow price in (A.3) is positive, i.e.,  
( ) 0F H F FE m m k u e
++ − − − >  
      (A.5) 
The proof for parts (c) and (e) of the proposition requires analyzing region R3. 
Region R3: In this region, it can observed from (2.13) that the second equation (first-order 
condition for QF) is a rearrangement of equation (2.9), and results in the same optimal solution 
QF0. 
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In order for QH* to be positive, we must have
( )
0
, 3
|
H
H F
Q
H
E Q Q R
Q =
 ∂ Π 
∂
 as positive. It is 
shown in the proof of Proposition 2A.4 that this derivative does not depend on the value of QF. 
Hence, 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
2 1
0
, 3
|
h
H
H F
Q H H H H F
H
eE Q Q R
k u m g e de m m g e de
Q
τ
τ τ
=
 ∂ Π  = − + + + −
∂ ∫ ∫  
must be positive, implying that  
( ) ( )0
, 3
0|
H
H F
Q H F H H
H
E Q Q R
E m m k u
Q
+
=
+ ∂ Π   = − − −  ∂
> .     (A.6) 
Therefore, ( )H F H HE m m k u+
+ − − −  
 must be positive for DE to be optimal. Otherwise, the first-
order derivative with respect to QH is negative and QH* = 0, which results in the offshore 
sourcing policy FH. 
On the other hand, defining τ'= τ (QH + QF  = QH0) = (cH + tH + kH – tF )/(cF – uF), we have 
( ) ( ) ( )0, |
H H
H F
F H F HQ Q
H
E Q Q
E m m E m M
Q
+ ++
=
+
 ∂ Π     = − − −      ∂
  < 0.    (A.7) 
As a result, QH* is lower than QH0 in this region. 
For parts (a), (b) and (d) of this proposition, we investigate Region R1. 
Note that OC2 is identical to inequality (A.5). Therefore, if OC2 does not hold (i.e., the first-
order derivative of the objective function in (A.2) with respect to QF in region R2 is negative), 
the optimal solution must lie in region R1. 
Region R1: In this region we can observe from the system of equations in (2.11) that the 
solution to the second equation (corresponding to the first-order condition for QF), i.e.,τHF*, is 
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identical to the solution in equation (2.9) , i.e., τF*. Therefore, an interior optimal solution must 
satisfy 
* * 0
H F FQ Q Q+ =       (A.8) 
From (A.8), we have
( )
( )0
, 1
 | 0
H F F
H F
Q Q Q
F
E Q Q R
Q + =
 ∂ Π  =
∂
at the optimal solution. In order for 
QH* to be positive, we need
( )
00, 
, 1
|
H F F
H F
Q Q Q
H
E Q Q R
Q = =
 ∂ Π 
∂
to be positive. We have 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
0 00, 0, 
, 1 , 1 , 1
| |
H F F H F F
H F H F H F
Q Q Q Q Q Q
H H F
H H H F F F
E Q Q R E Q Q R E Q Q R
Q Q Q
m k u E m k u e
= = = =
+
      ∂ Π ∂ Π ∂ Π      = −
∂ ∂ ∂ 
 
 = − − − − − 
. (A.9) 
Thus, ( )H H H F F Fm k u E m k u e+ − − − − −  must be positive for DR to be optimal. Otherwise, 
QH* = 0 corresponding to the offshore sourcing policy FL. 
On the other hand, from Lemma 2A.5, in order for QF* to be positive, QF0 > QH0 must hold. 
Equivalently, the derivative of the objective function in (A.1) with respect to QF along the line 
QH + QF = QH0 (i.e.,
( )
0
, 1
|
H F H
H F
Q Q Q
F
E Q Q R
Q + =
 ∂ Π 
∂
) must be positive. We have 
( ) ( )0
, 1
|
H F H
H F
F H F FQ Q Q
F
E Q Q R
E m M k u e
Q
++
+ =
 ∂ Π   = − − −  ∂
 .    (A.10) 
Hence, ( )F H F FE m M k u e
++ − − −  
 must also be positive for DR to be optimal. Otherwise, 
QF* = 0 corresponding to the onshore sourcing policy H. 
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Furthermore, as 
( )[ ]
0 , 0
,
| 0
H H F
H F
Q Q Q
H
E Q Q
Q = =
∂ Π
∂
=  by definition, and ( )[ ]
2 ,
0H F
H F
E Q Q
Q Q
∂ Π
<
∂ ∂
, we have
( )[ ]
0 , 0
,
| 0
H H F
H F
Q Q Q
H
E Q Q
Q = >
∂ Π
<
∂
, which implies that QH* must be lower than QH0 in region R1.  
The Special Case of Low Volatility in Exchange Rate and/or High Profit Margin:  
This is the special case where the volatility in exchange rate is so low, or the profit margin is 
so high, that mF > 0 for all exchange-rate realizations in the second stage (i.e., τ2 > eh in Figure 
2.3). First, the set of potentially optimal solutions remains the same. This is because the expected 
profit function in the first stage does not depend on τ2 in any of the regions. Consequently, the 
system of equations in (2.11) and (2.13) remain the same, which results in the same set of 
potentially optimal solutions. Second, the optimality conditions also remain the same. The reason 
is as follows: First, inequality (A.5) is independent of τ2. Second, in the derivations of equations 
(A.6), (A.7), (A.9) and (A.10), τ2 is replaced with eh, which causes Fm
+ to be replaced with Fm . 
Therefore, if mF is always positive, then we can simplify all of the optimality conditions by 
replacing Fm
+ with Fm . However, keeping Fm
+ leads to the general conditions.  
Therefore, the set of potentially optimal solutions and the optimality conditions are robust to 
the magnitude of exchange-rate volatility and to the variation in profit margin.  
Proof of Proposition 2.5. Note that the first-order derivative of the objective function in an 
offshore sourcing policy with respect to QF evaluated at qH0 is equal to the derivative of the 
global sourcing objective function with respect to QF evaluated at the same point. i.e., 
( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )0 0,| |0,
F H F H
H F H F
Q q Q q
F F
F H F F
E Q Q E Q Q
Q Q
E m m k u e
= =
++∂ Π ∂ Π
∂ ∂
=  − − −  
= =   
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Hence, QF0 > qH0 is equivalent to the optimal global sourcing policy being in region R3, and 
QF0 < qH0 is equivalent to the optimal global sourcing policy being in region R1. Moreover, for 
part (b), QF0 > QH0 ensures that the optimal policy is not H.  
Proof of Proposition 2.6. If kF + cF ē + tF < kH + cH + tH, then p – cF ē – tF – kF > p – cH – tH – 
kH , which means [ ] F H HF F HE m u ek km u> −−− − . This has two implications: First, the 
opposite of OC3 holds (i.e., F F F H H HE m k u e m k u
+  − − > − −  ), which in turn implies DR is 
never optimal in this case. Second, OC1 holds because 
( ) ( ) [ ] ( )F H F H F H H H F HH FH FE m M E k k um M E m m k u E m m u e+ +
++     − ≥ − = − − − > − − − >     
+   
 
Therefore, from Table 2.1, if OC2 does not hold, then FL is the optimal policy. Otherwise, if 
OC2 holds but OC4 does not hold, then FH is the optimal policy. Finally, if both OC2 and OC4 
hold, then DE is the optimal policy.  
Proof of Proposition 2.7. The inequality kF + cF ē + tF ≥ kH + cH + tH by itself does not imply 
that the optimality conditions hold or not. If OC2 holds and OC4 does not hold, the optimal 
policy is FH. Moreover, if OC2 and OC3 do not hold and OC1 holds, the optimal policy is FL.  
Proof of Proposition 2.8. The inequality p – (cF – uF) ē – tF < 0 does not eliminate the possibility 
of the optimality conditions associated with dual sourcing and offshore sourcing to hold. Thus, 
they may still be optimal sourcing policies.  
Proof of Proposition 2.9. (a) In region R3, the shadow price of QF is 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )3 ( )
, 3
F
l
he
H FR
Q FF F F F
F e
E Q Q R
k u e c u e g e deQ
Q
λ τ +
 ∂ Π = = − + + − −
∂ ∫  
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Let us define n(e) = (τ(QF) – e)+. Then, the shadow price can be expressed as
( ) ( ) ( )F F F Fk u e c u E n e − + + −   . Note that n(e) is piecewise linear and convex in e. Therefore, 
by the definition of second-order stochastic dominance, ( ) ( )E n e E n e   ≥     if e is a mean-
preserving spread of e . Consequently, the higher exchange-rate volatility, the higher the shadow 
price, and the higher the value of QF* in this region. 
In region R1, the shadow price of QF is 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 ( )
, 1
F
l
h
H F
e
H F
R
Q F F F F
F e
E Q Q R
k u e c u e g eQ de
Q
Qλ τ +
 ∂ Π = = − + + − −+
∂ ∫  
By similar argument QF* increases in exchange-rate volatility in this region as well. 
Note that in region R2, the shadow price is constant, and its sign, positive or negative, 
determines that the optimal solution is whether in region R3 or region R1, respectively. This 
shadow price is 
 ( ) ( )F H H H HF F F F F F FE c uE m m k u e c e u et t k u e
+ ++   − − − − + −= − + − −    
  
where (cH – uH + tH – cF e + uF e – tF )+ is convex in e. Therefore, this shadow price increases in 
exchange-rate volatility, which implies that as volatility increases the location of the optimal 
solution may switch from region R1 to region R3 but not in an opposite way. Since QF* is always 
higher in region R3 than in region R1, it follows that QF* always increases in exchange-rate 
volatility.  
For QH*, the shadow price in region R3 is 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )3
, 3
  
H
H FR
Q H H H F F F F F
H
E Q Q R
k c t c u e t E n ec u
Q
λ
 ∂ Π   = = − + + + − + + −  ∂
  
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where n(e)=[(τ1 – e)+ –(e –τ (QH))+] is piecewise linear but neither convex nor concave in e, 
which leads to an inconclusive result regarding the behavior of the domestic capacity in 
exchange-rate volatility. 
(b) From (2.5) using the Envelope Theorem, we have 
( ) ( )
( )
* *
* **
2
2
,
, | ,,
,
, ,,
, |
|
, ,
H H F F
H F H FH F
H F H F
q q q q
E q q Q QQ Q
E q q Q
x ee
e
x
e
Q
e
e
ππ
π
= =
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=
∂ ∂
 ∂
=   ∂
 

 
  
 (A.11) 
where 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
{ } ( )
2 , | , ( )
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n ,
h
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H F H F H H H H F F F F
x
H F
x
E q q Q Q c u t q c u e t q
p x q q f x
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e
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We note that 
( )2 , | ,, , ( )H F H F F F F
x e
e
E q q Q Q
c u q
π   − −
∂
=
∂
. Thus, from (A.11), 
( )* *,, ( )H F F F F
e
e
Q Q
c u q
π∂
= − −
∂
which implies ( )
2
2
* *, ( )( )
,H F F
F F
Q Q q ec u
e
e e
π∂
=
∂
∂
− −
∂
which is 
positive because qF* decreases in e. 
Consequently, ( )* , ,H FQ eQπ is convex in e, which by the definition of second-order 
stochastic dominance implies ( ) ( )* *, ,, ,H F H FE Q Q eQ Qe Eπ π   >     if e is a mean-preserving 
spread of e . As a result, the first-stage expected profit increases in exchange-rate volatility.  
Proof of Proposition 2.10. From the first equation of the system of equations in (2.13) for 
uniformly distributed exchange rate ( [ ]~ ,e U e d e d− + ), we have 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
1( )
1 1 
2
( 0
2
)
H
e d e d
F F F F F H H
Q
H H H Hc u e de c e u eQ c u tt de k ud dτ τ
τ
+ +
− −− − +− + − + + =∫ ∫  
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which simplifies to  
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
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2
2  ) 0
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−
. 
The feasible solution to this quadratic equation is 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
* 21  4  H HH F F F F F H HH
F F
e d c u e d t c u t d c u k u
c u
τ − + = + − − + + − − − + −
 
The square root term is guaranteed to be positive by OC4 which is required to hold under 
policy DE. It follows that 
( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
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2
 2
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F F F H HH H H
H H
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F F F F FH H H
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τ − +
−
 − + + − − +∂  = −
∂  − + + − − − + +
. 
The root of the above partial derivative occurs when 
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which reduces to (cF – uF) ē + tF – (kH + cH  + tH) = 0. As a result, when kH + cH  + tH < (cF – uF) ē 
+ tF, we have 
*
0H
d
τ∂
>
∂
 which by definition (τH *= τ (QH*) = (p [(1 – F(QH*)] – tF)/ (cF – uF)) 
implies 
*
0HQ
d
∂
<
∂
.  
Proof of Proposition 2.11. In case 1, by Proposition 2.6, the potentially optimal policies are FL, 
FH, and DE. From Proposition 2.9, we know that the left-hand side (LHS) of OC2 and QF* 
increase in exchange-rate volatility. As a result, the optimal policy can switch from FL in region 
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R1 to FH in region R3, and not in the opposite way. Depending on whether OC4 holds in region 
R3, the optimal policy may change to DE. 
In case 2, all policies can potentially be optimal. At sufficiently low degrees of exchange-rate 
volatility, the firm adopts policy H due to the lower cost of onshore sourcing. Note that under 
policy H, when OC1 does not hold, OC2 does not hold either. Moreover, if OC1 does not hold, 
OC3 holds because 
( )
0
F F H H F F
F
H F H
F H F
F k u e kE m m E mu k u e
k uM e
M
E m
+ +
++
   − − − = − −   
 < − − < 
− − −
−
 

.    (A.12) 
Higher levels of exchange-rate volatility cause the LHS of OC1 to increase (by similar 
argument as presented in proof of proposition 2.9) until OC1 holds. Observe that due to 
inequality (A.12), at this switching point, OC3 still holds. This is where DR becomes the optimal 
policy. As exchange-rate volatility increases, the LHS of OC2 increases and the LHS of OC3 
decreases. The latter is because mF+ is convex in e, thus ( )HF HF F Hk u e km uE m + −  − −  −−  
increases in exchange-rate volatility by a similar argument as mentioned in proof of Proposition 
2.9. Depending on whether OC3 does not hold or OC2 holds first, the optimal policy path is 
different. If OC3 does not hold first, FL becomes the optimal policy first and similar to case 1, 
the next optimal policies are FH (when OC2 holds) and DE if OC4 holds as well. Otherwise, if 
OC2 holds before OC3 is reversed, the optimal solution moves to R3. But this also causes OC4 
to hold because the LHS of OC4 is the summation of the LHS of OC2 and that of OC3. 
Therefore, if both OC2 and OC3 hold, OC4 holds as well. That implies that the optimal solution 
may directly switch from DR to DE. 
Proof of Proposition 2.12. (a) For eα ≥ τ2, we have qF*(eα) = 0. By supposition, we have 
( ) ( ), *0, Fe x QP β α < − >Π   . 
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Furthermore,  
 ( )0 |, AFQ eαΠ = β− , ( )0 |, AFQ eΠ < β−  for all e > eα, ( )0 |, AFQ eΠ > β−  for all e < eα,  
and thus, ( ) ( ), 0, AFe x QP β α < − =Π   . 
Define  
( )AF HQ Q ≡ ( ) ( ) [ ] ( )H H H H F F H H F Fp k c t Q k u e M Q k u eα αβ β − − − + = + + +         (A.13) 
and note that ( ) ( )( ), , AF He x HQ Q QP β α < − =Π    for all 0 ≤ QH ≤ xL. 
(a) If AFQ = ( )0AFQ > qH0, we can substitute the capacity investment in (A.13) into the first-
stage objective function associated with R3 and take its first-order derivative with respect to QH. 
The total derivative of that function with respect to QH can be expressed as: 
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From Proposition 2A.4, 
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H F
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 ∂ Π   = − + − − − + − ∂ ∫  . 
Thus,  
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Because the last two terms simplify to ( )H FE m m +
+ −  
 , we can rewrite the derivative as  
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Note that the first term is positive since QFA < QF0, and the last three terms form the LHS of 
OC4 is negative because of the definition of policy FH. Because ( ) ( ) ( )
l le e
e g e de G e de
τ τ
τ − =∫ ∫ , the 
above condition is equivalent to RA1. Therefore, when QFA > qH0, if RA1 holds, the firm 
satisfies the VaR constraint and increases expected profit by increasing QH from 0 to any QH ∈ 
(0, xL] while simultaneously increasing QF from ( )0AFQ  to ( )AF HQ Q , and thus engages in dual 
sourcing under risk aversion. 
(b) If AFQ = ( )0AFQ ≤ qH0, regardless of whether FH or FL is the optimal policy in the risk-
neutral setting, we can substitute the capacity investment in (A.13) into the first-stage objective 
function associated with R1 and take its first-order derivative with respect to QH: 
( )( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
, 1 , 1 ,
.
1
| |A A
F H F H
A A
F H F FF H
Q Q Q Q
H H
H
H
HH F
d Q Q E Q E QdQ Q
d Q d
E Q R Q R Q R
Q Q Q
∂ ∂
= +
∂


∂
Π Π Π  
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From Proposition 2A.2, 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ), 1
( )
H F
l
Q Q
H F
F F F F H F
F e
E Q Q R
k u e c u t Q Q e g e de
Q
τ + ∂ Π  = − + + − + −
∂ ∫ , and, 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
, 1
( )
( )
h
H
H F
l
e
H F
H H H F F F F H
H Q
Q Q
F F H F
e
F
E Q Q R
k c t c u c u e Q g e de
Q
c u Q Q e g e
e
de
t
τ
τ
τ
τ
+
 ∂ Π  = − + + + − − − −
∂
+ − + −
+ ∫
∫
 
Thus, 
( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )
( )( )
( )
( )( )
( )( ) ( )
0
,
(
|
)
1
A
F H
l
A
H
l
F H
A
F H
Q Q
AH
F F F F F H
F F e
Q Q
H
Q
H
A
F HH F F F
e
Q Q
M k u e c u Q Q e g e e de
dE Q R
dQ
M E m
k u e
c Q eQu e g de
τ
τ
τ
τ
=
+
 Π  =
  − + − − 
 
 − + + − −
 +



+
∫
∫
 
Therefore, when QFA ≤ qH0 and dual sourcing is the optimal sourcing policy under risk 
aversion if 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )
( )( )
( )
( )( )
( )( ) ( )
, ,
, ,
, , ( )
, , 0
A
F H
l
A
F H
l
Q Q e
AH
F F F F F H
F F e
Q Q e
A
F
e
HH F F F
M k u e c u Q Q e e
M E m c u e g e d
g e e de
k u e
Q Q e e
α
α
τ β
α
β
α
τ
τ β
βτ+
 
 − + + − −
 +

  − + − − >   

+ ∫
∫

 ,  
due to submodularity of the expected profit function, LHS of RA2 is larger than that of RA1. 
Thus, under risk aversion, it is more likely for dual sourcing to be adopted when QFA ≤ qH0 than 
when QFA > qH0.  
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Proof of Proposition 2.13. (a) Recall that eα denotes the exchange rate realization at fractile 1 – 
α (i.e., [1 – G(eα)] = α). The realized profit is greater than or equal to –β when the exchange-rate 
random variable takes values in the range el ≤ e ≤ eα, and the probability of loss greater than or 
equal to β is less than or equal to α. In (2.20), we can equate the profit at e = eα inside the 
probability expression to –β in order to determine the number of hedging contracts necessary to 
warrant profitability that satisfies the VaR requirement: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }
* *
* * * *min ,
H H F F H H H F F F
H H H F F F s H F
sk Q k Q c t q e c e t q e
u Q q e u e Q q e e e H p x q
h
e
H
e
e
q
α α α
α α α α α α
β+ +
 − − − + − +  = 
− − − − + − + +  
−
− .  
Solving for H at the lowest demand realization x = xl provides the minimum (optimal) 
number of hedging contracts satisfying VaR at e = eα: 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ){ }
( )( )
* *
* * * *
*
min ,
H H F F H H H F F F
H H H F F F l F
s
s
H
s
k Q k Q c t q e c e t q e
u Q q e u e Q q e p x q e
H e
q e
e he e
α α α
α α α α α
α
β
+ +
 + + + + + 
 
+ − + − − + −  
− −
= .  
(b) Taking the expectation of the term (e – es)H in (2.19) over all exchange-rate realizations 
provides the expected return of ( ) ( )
h
l
e
s
e
H e e g e de
 
−  
 
∫  in stage 2, which is equal to the first-stage 
payment of ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
h s h
s l l
e e e
s s s s
e e e
h e H H e e g e de e e g e de H e e g e de
   
= − − − = −      
   
∫ ∫ ∫  for H 
units of hedging contracts in (2.18). Thus, the expected profit for any given (QH, QF) decision 
made in stage 1 in the risk-neutral setting can be replicated through purchasing H*(es) units of 
contracts in (2.21) under risk aversion to satisfy VaR.  
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Appendix to Chapter 3 
Proof of Proposition 3.1. The first- and second-order derivatives of the second-stage profit 
function (3.4) with respect to q are respectively: 
( ) ( ) ( )
2
2
22
( ) ln
( )
( ) 0
s
d q M q Mv s
dq k q M q
d q M M M
dq q M q q M qM q
π ββ
ϕ
π β β β
 −
= − + −  − 
 
= − − = − < 
− −−   
 
Thus, as shown in Proposition 1 in Noparumpa et al. (2015) for a similar problem, π(q) is 
concave in q. The unconstrained optimal processing quantity q0(φ) can then be obtained from the 
first order condition (FOC) (We use superscript “0” for the optimal decisions associated with the 
problem where there is no supply constraint). That is, q0 (φ) solves 
ln 0
( )s
M q Mv s
k q M q
ββ
ϕ
 −
− + − =  − 
which implies 
( )
sv sM
M qM q e
k q
β
ϕ
−
−
−− = . We rearrange to get 
( )/ 1 / ( )s
q
v sM qq e e k
M q
β ϕ− −− =
−
 which conforms to the Lambert W function structure. Thus, 
( )( )/ 1 / ( )sv sq W e kM q
β ϕ− −=
−
which implies  
( )
( )
( )/ 1
0
( )/ 1
/ ( )
( ) ( )
1 / ( )
s
s
v s
v s
W e k
q M M
W e k
β
β
ϕ
ϕ α ϕ
ϕ
− −
− −
= =
+
    (A.14) 
Substituting (A.14) into (3.2), we get
( ) ( )
( )/ 10
( )/ 1
1( ) ln ln ( ) / ( )
( ) / ( )
s
s
v s
s sv s
p v v k W e k
k W e k
β
β
ϕ β β ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ
− −
− −
 
  = + = −    
.  
Note that by the definition of the Lambert W function ( )( ) W zW z e z= , which implies 
( )( ) ( ) ( )W zk W z e k zϕ ϕ= , and thus [ ] [ ]ln ( ) ( ) ( ) ln ( )k W z W z k zϕ ϕ+ = . Let ( )/ 1 / ( )sv sz e kβ ϕ− −= . It 
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follows that ( ) ( )( )/ 1 ( )/ 1 ( )/ 1ln ( ) / ( ) / ( ) ln ( ) / 1s s sv s v s v s sk W e k W e k e v sβ β βϕ ϕ ϕ β− − − − − −   + = = − −   . 
Therefore, we can re-write p0(φ) as   
( )
( )
( )/ 10
( )/ 1
( ) ( ) / 1 / ( )
1 / ( )
s
s
v s
s s
v s
p v v s W e k
s W e k
β
β
ϕ β β ϕ
β ϕ
− −
− −
 = − − − − 
 = + + 
 
Therefore, if Qy ≥ q0(φ), q*(φ)  = q0(φ) , p*(φ)  = p0(φ) , and the optimal second-stage profit is  
( ) ( ) ( )( )/ 1* , , /  ( )sv sQ y W e k s r QM yβπ ϕ β ϕ− −= + −  
which results from substituting (A.14) into (3.4). 
Otherwise, if Qy < q0(φ), due to concavity of π(q), q*(φ)  = Qy, and equations (3.2) and (3.4) 
yield p*(φ) and π*(Q,y,φ), respectively.  
Proof of Proposition 3.2. If Qy < Mα(φ), taking the first-order derivative of p*(φ, y) expressed 
in Proposition 3.1 with respect to φ, we get 
( )/* '
( )/
( , ) ( ) 11      if ( )
( ) 1 ( )
c
c
v
v
p y k e Qy M
k e k
ϕ β
ϕ β
ϕ ϕβ α ϕ
ϕ ϕ ϕ
−
−
∂ −
= = = − <
∂ +
   (A.15) 
where the last two equalities use the definition of k(φ) by (3.3). 
If Qy ≥ Mα(φ), we have 
*( ) ( ) ( ).p dW z dz
dz d
ϕ ϕβ
ϕ ϕ
∂
=
∂
     (A.16) 
where ( )/ 1( ) / ( )sv sz e kβϕ ϕ− −= . In order to find dW(z)/dz, we take the derivative of both sides of 
( )( ) W zW z e z=  with respect to z (Noparumpa et al. 2015) to get ' ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 1W z W zW z e W z e + = 
which yields 
[ ]
( ) ( ) ( )
1 ( ) ( )
dW z W z
dz z W z z
α ϕ
ϕ
= =
+
      (A.17) 
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We then find the derivative of z(φ) with respect to φ as 
' '
( )/ 1
2
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 11
( ) ( ) ( )
sv sdz k k z ze
d k k k
βϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ ϕ β ϕ
− −  − −= = = − 
 
   (A.18) 
Therefore, substituting (A.17) and (A.18) into (A.16), we get 
*( , ) 1( ) 1     if ( )
( )
p y Qy M
k
ϕ α ϕ α ϕ
ϕ ϕ
 ∂
= − ≥ ∂  
    (A.19) 
Note that by definition, α(φ) < 1 (Proposition 3.1), and k(φ) > 1 (equation (3.3)). Therefore, 
(A.15) and (A.19) imply that ∂p*(φ,y)/∂φ < 1.  
Proof of Proposition 3.3. From Proposition 3.1, we can re-write α(φ) expression as 
( ) ( )( ) / 1W z W zα ϕ  = +  where 
( )/ 1 / ( )sv sz e kβ ϕ− −= . By chain rule, we have 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ). .d d W dW z dz
d dW dz d
α ϕ α ϕ
ϕ ϕ
=  (A.20) 
The first derivative on the right-hand side (RHS) is 
[ ]2
( ) 1
1 ( )
d W
dW W z
α
=
+
     (A.21) 
Using the derivations in the proof of Proposition 3.2, we substitute (A.21), (A.17), and 
(A.18) into (A.20) to get 
[ ]3
( ) ( ) 11
( )1 ( )
d W z
d kW z
α ϕ
ϕ ϕβ
 
= − 
+  
 
which is positive. The results follow. 
Proof of Proposition 3.4. (a) The first-order derivative of the expected profit function (3.5) with 
respect to Q is 
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( ) ( )
( )
( )
ln ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
s
U Q
O Q
M Qy Ml ry y v g y h dyd
Q k Qy M Qy
syg y h dy
Q
d
β β ϕ ϕ
ϕ
ϕ ϕ
  −
− + + + −   −  
Π
+
∂
=
∂ ∫∫
∫∫
 
and the second-order derivative with respect to Q is: 
( )
2
2
)
2
(
( ) ( ) 0
U Q
y M g y h dyd
Q Q M Qy
Q β ϕ ϕ − < −
∂

Π
=
∂ ∫∫ . 
Consequently, the expected profit function is concave in Q and (3.6) is the FOC which yields 
the unique optimal leasing quantity. 
(b) By substituting Q* into (3.5) and rearranging, the optimal expected profit can be 
expressed as: 
( ) ( )
*
*
* *
* *
*
* *
* ( )
( )
( )/ 1*
*
( ) ( )
ln ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
s
s
U Q
O Q
v s
U Q O Q
Q l ry Q
M Q y My v g y h dyd
k Q y M Q yQ
syg y h dyd
Q y eM g y h dyd W g y h dyd
M Q y k
β
β β ϕ ϕ
ϕ
ϕ ϕ
β ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
ϕ
− −
∏ = − +
   −
+ −    −   +  
+ 
  
  
+ +  −   
∫∫
∫∫
∫∫ ∫∫
   (A.22) 
Substituting the FOC (3.6) into (A.22), the first two terms cancel out, which results in (3.7). 
 
Proof of Remark 3.1. ( ) /DQ M yα ϕ= is larger than ( ) /T l hQ M yα ϕ= , because hy y< , and 
according to proposition 3.3, 1ϕ ϕ>  implies 1( ) ( )α ϕ α ϕ> . 
Proof of Proposition 3.5. (a) Note that according to Proposition 3.3, the processor targets the 
smallest portion of the high-end segment when the commodity price is realized at its lowest level 
(φl). Therefore, the processor underinvests in DT if and only if Q*yh < Mα(φl), i.e., the first-order 
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derivative of the (first-stage) expected profit function with respect to Q evaluated at Mα(φl)/ yh 
must be negative (Note that in this case Qy < Mα(φ) for all realizations of y and φ): 
( ) ( )( )
  
( )ln ( ) ( ) 0
( ) ( ) ( )
|
l
h
h l h
s
l h lAy
M
y y yl ry y v g y h dyd
Q k y y
Q
yϕα
α ϕβ β ϕ ϕ
ϕ α ϕ α ϕ
  −
− + + + − <   −  
∂Π
=
∂ ∫∫  
which results in condition (3.8).  
(b) When the processor adopts the underinvestment policy, the crop supply always falls short 
of the optimal demand and the processor sets a market-clearing price in the second stage, which 
results in the optimal second-stage profit as expressed below: 
( )* , , ln
( )
 U s
M QyQ y v r
k Q
y
y
Qπ ϕ β
ϕ
 −
− +  
 
 
=  
 
 
Therefore, the first-stage expected profit function can be expressed as: 
( ) ( )
  
ln ( ) ( )
( )U sA
M Qyl ry Q Qy v g y h dyd
k Qy
Q β ϕ ϕ
ϕ
  −
∏ = − + + +  
  
∫∫    (A.23) 
From Proposition 3.4, we can infer that ΠU(Q) is concave in Q, and thus the below FOC 
yields the optimal leasing quantity (QU*). 
( )
  
ln ( ) ( ) 0
( )
U
s
A
M Qy My y v g y h dyd
Q k Qy
Q
Q
l
M
r
y
β β ϕ ϕ
ϕ
  −
+ + − =   − 
∂Π
= − −
∂ 
∫∫   (A.24) 
(c) Note that by substituting QU* into (A.23) and rearranging, the optimal expected profit can 
be written as: 
( ) ( )
*
  
  
* * *
* *
*
*
ln ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
U
U U U
U U
U
U
U s
A
A
M y Ml ry y v g y h dyd
k y M y
yM g y h
QQ Q Q
Q Q
d dQ y
yM Q
β β ϕ ϕ
ϕ
β ϕ ϕ
  −
∏ = − + + −
 
+    −  
−

+

∫∫
∫∫
 
Substituting (A.24) into (A.23), the first two terms cancel out, and we get (3.10): 
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( )
* *
*
 
*
 
* ( ) ( ) ( )
h
l
y
U
A y
U U
U
U U
y yM g y h dyd M g y dy
y
Q QQ
M yM Q Q
β ϕ ϕ β∏ = =
− −∫∫ ∫ . 
(d) QU* < QT directly follows from part (a).  
Proof of Proposition 3.6. (a) Condition (3.8) can be expressed as 
( )( , ) 0Yl ry E E n YΨ  − − + Φ <  , where 
[ ] [ ]
( )( , ) ln
( ) ( ) ( )
ln ( ) ln ( ) ( )
( )
h h h
s
h h h
h
s h h h
h h
y y yn y y v
k y y y
yy v y y k y
y y
α ϕϕ β β
ϕ α ϕ α ϕ
β α ϕ β ϕ α ϕ β
α ϕ
  −
= + −   −  
 
= + − − − − 
  (A.25) 
Note that n(y, φ) is concave in y. This is because 
( )2
2
( ) ( ) ( )( , ) 1ln
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )ln
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
h h h h h h
s
h h h h h h h
h h h h
s
h h h h h
y y y yn y v y
y k y y y y y y y y
y y y yv
k y y y y y
α ϕ α ϕ α ϕϕ β β β
ϕ α ϕ α ϕ α ϕ α ϕ
α ϕβ β β
ϕ α ϕ α ϕ α ϕ
  − −∂  = + − + − −   ∂ − − −   
   −
= + − −    − −   
  
and thus, 
( ) ( )
22
2 32
( ) ( ) 2 ( )( , ) 1 0
( ) ( ) ( )
h h h h h
h h h h h h
y yn y
y y y y y y y y
α ϕ α ϕ α ϕϕ β
α ϕ α ϕ α ϕ
 ∂  = − + + + <
 ∂ − − − 
 
which is negative because by definition, yh  > y, and 0 < α(φ) < 1 (Proposition 3.1), and thus yh > 
α(φh) y which implies the first and the last term within the parenthesis are positive. As a result, 
by the definition of second-order stochastic dominance, EY[n(Y2, Φ)] < EY[n(Y1, Φ)] if Y2 is a 
mean-preserving spread of Y1. This implies that, as the degree of yield uncertainty increases, the 
left-hand side (LHS) of (3.8) decreases, which means (3.8) eventually holds as the variation 
increases, if it holds when the random yield features the highest possible variation, i.e., two-point 
distribution. 
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We take an analogous approach to prove the LHS of (3.8) decreases in commercial price 
uncertainty. We rewrite condition (3.8) as ( )( , ) 0Yl ry E E n YΨ − − + Φ <  , where n(y, φ) is 
defined by (A.25), and show that n(y, φ) is concave in φ. We have 
'( , ) ( ) 11
( ) ( )
n y ky y
k k
ϕ ϕβ
ϕ ϕ ϕ
   ∂
= − = −   ∂   
 
and thus, 
2 '
2 2
( , ) ( ) 11 0
( ) ( )
n y k yy
k k
ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ β ϕ
 ∂ −
= = − < ∂  
 
which is negative since by definition, k(φ) > 1 (equation (3.3)). Therefore, the results follow.  
(b) We demonstrate that ( ) ( )* *U UQ Q∏ < ∏ . Rewriting (3.7) and (3.10), we express the 
difference as: 
( ) ( )
*
*
*
( )/ ( )/ 1*
*
( )/
( )/ *
*
( )/
* *
*
*
*
1
*
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
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h h s
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h h
l l
l
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U
U
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U
y
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y
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M Q y k
yM g y h dyd
y
yQ y g y d
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Q
y
M Q y y
M
eW
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Q
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ϕ α ϕ β
ϕ α ϕ
ϕ
ϕ
α ϕ
β
β ϕ ϕ
ϕ
β ϕ ϕ
β
ϕ
− −
− −
  
∏ − ∏ = +  −   
−
 
− − 
=
 
+ − 
 
−
−
∫ ∫ ∫
∫ ∫
∫
*
*
*
( )/
( ) ,
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h
h
l
y
M Q
U
U
Q
M
h d
y g y dy
yQ
ϕ
ϕ
α ϕ
ϕ ϕ
 
 
 

−

  
   
  
∫
∫
 
and make two observations. First, the first term within the bracket is positive because QU* < Q*. 
Second, the second term within the bracket is also positive, because QU* y < Mα(φ) for any 
realizations of y and φ by the definition of underinvestment, and thus, 
( )* /
*
1( ) ( )
( ) 1 ( ) ( )
sv s
U
U
y M eW
y M M k
Q
M Q
βα ϕ α ϕ
α ϕ α ϕ ϕ
− − 
< = =  − −  −
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As a result, ( ) ( )* * 0U UQ Q∏ − ∏ > . 
Proof of Proposition 3.7. When the commercial price is deterministic and the processor 
encounters only yield uncertainty, we can replace φ with ϕ in all expressions of Proposition 3.1 
including the optimal second-stage profit function expressions as follows: 
( )
( ) ( )
*
( )/ 1
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When the yield is deterministic, and the processor encounters only commercial price 
uncertainty, the optimal second-stage profit function becomes (note that α(φ) is an increasing 
function of φ) : 
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The first-stage expected profit function can then be written as: 
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As a result, conditions (A.26) and (A.27) show that uncertainty in either yield or commercial 
price by itself can lead to the underinvestment policy.  
Proof of Proposition 3.8. (a) The FOC for the underinvestment policy (3.9) can be re-written as:  
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the proof of proposition 3.6, if we show that nU (Q,y,φ) is concave in y and φ, the LHS of (A.28) 
decreases in yield and commercial price uncertainty, respectively, and thus, the optimal leasing 
quantity must decrease in the level of uncertainty in order to satisfy the FOC (due to concavity of 
the expected profit function). 
We observe that nU (Q,y,φ) is indeed concave in both y and φ, because 
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(b) When the underinvestment policy is optimal, the first-stage expected profit function in 
(A.23) can be expressed as: 
( ) [ ], ( , , )Y Ul ry Q E m Q YΨ− + + Φ , where ( , , ) ln ( )U s
M Qym Q Y Qy v
k Qy
β
ϕ
  −
Φ = +  
  
.  
We show mU (Q,y,φ) is concave in both y and φ, and thus due to a similar argument 
developed in the proof of proposition 3.6, the first-stage expected profit decreases in the yield 
and commercial price variation. Note that 
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Hence, the results follow.  
Proof of Proposition 3.9. (a) The first-order derivative of the first-stage expected profit function 
(3.11) with respect to Q is 
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and thus, the processor underinvests if and only if ( )* ( ) ( )pc h h lQ y M y Mα ϕ α ϕ< = , or 
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Next, we compare (A.29) with its corresponding condition in the case of less-than-perfect 
correlation where Φ(y) is the random commercial price with E[Φ(y)] = φ(y). Note that the LHS 
of (A.29) can then be written as: 
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where the inequality holds due to Jensen’s inequality and the fact that the term 
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 within the integrals is concave in φ. We note that 
under less-than-perfect correlation (including the case of two independent random variables), it 
is optimal for the processor to underinvest if the RHS of the above inequality becomes negative. 
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As a result, (A.30) implies that if underinvestment is optimal under perfect correlation, it 
must be optimal under less-than-perfect correlation as well.  
(b) When the underinvestment policy is optimal, denoting the first-stage expected profit 
function under perfect correlation by ( )Upc Q∏ , and that under less-than-perfect correlation by 
( )Ulc Q∏ , we have 
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